By D.V. Streltsov[1]
The article addresses recent trends in the development of the US-Japan political and defense alliance, including the sphere of operational planning and coordination. A special attention is drawn to the problem of interaction between the two countries in the area of Ballistic Missile Defense, Japan`s procurement of American fighters F-35, as well as the issue of relocation of the Futenma base in Okinawa. The author sifts the results of the recent US-Japan Summit held in Washington D.C. on April 30, 2012.
The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan acquired a new meaning at the end of the bi-polar epoch. The Treaty was a kind of deficient as compared to network security formats, among them NATO. Japan`s strategic integration in the U.S.-centered security system of the post-war period remained one order lower than that of NATO member countries in contrast to which Japan has been officially denying the U.S. the deployment of nuclear weapons within its territory and abstaining from any forms of joint commands with the Pentagon; besides it participates in military operations only in the case of a direct threat to its sovereignty. On the whole, the Treaty was a cornerstone of the renowned "system of axis and spokes" in which Washington concluded a series of bilateral defense and military-political treaties with major allies in East Asian.
The role and functions of the Japanese-U.S. military-political union were seriously modified in the second half of the 1990s amid the military and economic growth of China and, especially, its policy of armed forces modernization.
The allies regarded the growing military might of China as a fundamental challenge requiring a deterrence strategy. The Pentagon launched the "fencing" policy, which implied the shift of naval activity from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific, alternation of the military bases structure and ultimate regrouping of forces with due account of the Chinese factor. Simultaneously Washington, seeking stronger positions in East Asia, started optimization of bilateral security treaties by increasing the military contribution of its strategic allies and providing greater equality in the operative and strategic interaction with them.
On the other hand, the Japanese opinion about significance of the military union with the U.S. has also transformed. Tokyo felt a direct military threat from China, which shifted from the category of "a partner" and "a responsible shareholder" to the category of "a military rival". The transformation became particularly rapid after September 2010, when Beijing put unprecedented military-diplomatic pressure on Tokyo in connection with the Senkaku Islands tensions. China was re-evaluated not only by the political leadership but also in minds of average Japanese who developed a feeling of a direct military danger.
A new level of military-strategic cooperation was affirmed at the annual security conferences of the defense and foreign affairs ministers (the two plus two format). In June 2011 the sides openly stoke in favor of multilateral security cooperation with Australia, South Korea, India and other countries, that was new to the security strategy considering the common military threats listed in the joint statement.
Japan gradually increased the operative-technical and military-strategic cooperation with the partner. For instance, new forms of operative planning and coordination with the United States were developed. Japan and the United States deployed a joint air defense command post at the U.S. Yokota airbase employing officers of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces and the U.S. Air Force[1]. The zone of Japanese responsibility in joint patrolling of sea shipping lanes has broadened to the Taiwan Strait.
Tomodati (Friends) Operation staged by servicemen of the two countries after the catastrophe of March 11, 2011, was a sign of a new level of coordination. The interaction had been tested mainly in military exercises before; now they were practicing a full-scale joint operation involving all branches and services. Japanese helicopters were deployed on the U.S. aircraft carriers, U.S. warships transported Self-Defense Forces personnel and rescue machines to the disaster zone. Signal Corps officers were exchanged to provide interaction on the operative level.
Japan continued to develop seaborne and land theater missile defense systems together with the United States. The system has been developing after Pyongyang tested Taepodong ballistic missiles in 1998, which flew over the Honshu Island and fell down into the high seas. SM-3 Aegis interceptor missiles were installed on four destroyers of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces and a number of RAS-3 interceptor missile systems were deployed on the Japanese territory. Japan stepped up the development of radar observation systems together with the Americans. The missile defense program stipulated joint development of new-generation interceptor missiles and SM-3 modernization. Consistent with the program of missile defense of the theater of operations the Japanese Naval Self-Defense Forces were supposed to receive four to six destroyers carrying the newest missile defense systems Aegis that could shoot down North Korean Nodong missiles.
Japanese procurement of U.S. fifth-generation fighter jets was considered in the context of allied relations. The question of supplying the fighters to the Japanese Self-Defense Forces appeared due to the significant change of the military-political situation in Northeast Asia where China and Russia - countries that Tokyo considered to be more or less potential military rivals - were actively developing and deploying stealth fighters. The need for gradual replacement of outdated F-4 and F-15 fighters of Japan also played a role.
Initially Tokyo intended to replace them with F-22 Raptor fifth-generation fighters. But U.S. laws ban exports of these armaments. The F-22 procurement also constitutes a legal problem for Japan, which cannot have offensive armaments due to the constitutional limits. After a long debate, Japan decided in December 2011 to procure Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. The first four jets (each costs 9.9 billion yen or approximately $121.62 million) will have been put into service by March 2017[2]. Experts estimate total Japanese spending on the fighters at nearly $13 billion. Japan is supposed to acquire about 40 fighters by mid-2020s[3].
The type of fighter jets was chosen for the following considerations. Firstly, it has a better level of technology and protection from radars, as well as other technical characteristics superior to the rivals, such as F/A-18 Hornet and Eurofighter Typhoon. Secondly, the deal with the Americans will give Japanese companies an access to assembly, maintenance and modernization of the jet - a contribution of Japan to the fighter production is estimated at 40%, that is supposed to boost the national economy. The Japanese particularly value the fact that Lockheed has agreed to share highly classified information about the jet fuselage design with Japan in the interests of technological cooperation. Thus the Japanese companies may participate in the development of innovative military technologies, which may also be used in the national aircraft industry. For example, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries expects to use them in the production of the newest fighter Shinshin.
Thirdly, there are military-political grounds, such as the fact that F-35 is being adopted by main military allies of Tokyo in the region - the United States and Australia. Besides, procurement of the fighters will help improve strategic relations with the Americans, which have been witnessing a certain crisis related to the unsettled Futenma base problem after 2009. Alongside the Tomodati Operation, the F-35 deal is meant to be a symbolic step signifying progress in the relations between allies.
The question of Japan`s complete fulfillment of its financial commitments to the U.S. military bases in its territory constituted a certain problem for the military-political alliance with America in the 2000s. Japan covers a significant part (about three-fourth) of the operating costs of the U.S. military facilities and pays salaries to approximately 25,000 Japanese employees of the bases. Total annual expenditures under the financial liabilities of the receiving party roughly stand at 188 billion yens ($2.2 billion at the exchange rate USD1 = JPY82). The problem is that Japan, which is on the brink of a state financial crisis, is doing its best to cut budgetary expenditures and constantly raises the question of lesser commitments to its partner.
The sides agreed in December 2010 that starting from the fiscal year 2011 Japan would have continued to meet its financial liabilities to the bases for five years at the current rates. Succumbing to the Japanese demands, the U.S. agreed to the gradual reduction of the Japanese personnel of the bases and the Japanese contribution to the bases` operation from 76 to 72%.
Relocation of the Futenma base in Okinawa remains a complex problem of the alliance. The principal decision to move the Futenma marine base to Henoko in northern Okinawa was made in 2006 to improve the life of local residents suffering from noise and other risks created by helicopter flights in the direct proximity to residential areas. The reached agreement crowned 13 years of negotiations, which were sporadically strained with various incidents involving U.S. servicemen, such as the rape of a Japanese schoolgirl by a U.S. serviceman in 1995 and the crash of a U.S. military helicopter in the premises of the university campus in 2004.
The agreement, dubbed the roadmap, was a package deal and implied the base`s relocation to less densely populated area of the island, including the construction of a new airfield, and the pullout of the third expedition of the marines corps (8,000 servicemen) from Okinawa to Guam. The plan would have reduced U.S. military presence in Okinawa and the burden on the prefecture imposed by the presence of American troops on the island (Okinawa, which accounts for about 1% of the Japanese territory, deploys 65% of all U.S. troops stationed in Japan). Japan undertook a commitment to cover about 60% of the base relocation costs, which were estimated at some $10.3 billion at that time.
The position of the Henoko authorities, which opposed the plan under the pressure of local residents (consent of the municipality is required by law) presented the biggest problem for the Japanese government. The failure to find an alternative base location was a cause of the resignation of the Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama Government in 2010. The sides did not find a mutually acceptable solution in the office of the Prime Minister Naoto Kan Cabinet either; that government focused on the country`s recovery from the natural calamity of March 11, 2011.
As a result, the Futenma base relocation, a stumbling stone in the bilateral relations, was inherited by the Yoshihira Noda Cabinet, which took the office in August 2011. The prime minister found himself in a desperate position. It was impossible to keep freezing the problem because that would have endangered the U.S. reform of military presence in the Western part of the Pacific Ocean, a key element of which was the transfer a part of the US marine from Japanese bases to Guam. It was necessary to rapidly unblock relations with the partner because of the threats to national military security, as well. Japan realized how important those threats in 2010-2012 were, when tensions kept mounting in nearby areas. That was the time of the Chinese fishing boat incident off the Senkaku Islands and higher tension on the Korean Peninsula (bombardment of Yeonpyeong, North Korean rocket tests and so on). There were domestic political reasons, as well: the Democratic Party of Japan was catastrophically losing support of voters and urgently needed foreign political successes before the parliamentary election.
However, the implementation of the roadmap of 2006 encountered big problems associated with its rejection by the local public, the opinion of which the Democratic Party, which gained power through populist promises, could not ignore. They found no Japanese region whereat local administration would agree to accommodate the base. Besides, the plan of 2006, which included construction of a helicopter base and other expensive military infrastructure, bumped into opposition in the U.S. Congress.
Three influential senators (Carl Levin, John McCain and Jim Webb) said in May 2011 that U.S. taxpayers would have to pay too much for the plan and it was necessary to think about relocation of the base to the existing military sites in Okinawa, such as the Kadena airbase. The Senate, which approves the plan financing, ordered an independent evaluation by a non-governmental think tank, the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Meanwhile, the Kadena Mayor declared that the local authorities categorically refused to approve the relocation plans. The Pentagon also expressed doubts about the expediency of moving the marines to Kadena, in which case the base would have acquired extrinsic functions. The Americans decided in late 2011 that it would be politically inexpedient to "drown" the Japanese partner for non-fulfillment of old agreements and proposed an urgent search for a mutually acceptable way out of the impasse.
The U.S. and Japan agreed in February 2012 that relocation of the base should be considered separately from the broader issue of the reduction and optimization of the U.S. military presence in Japan, including pullout of the U.S. marines. The joint statement of the U.S. and Japanese governments posted on February 8 said that the plan of relocation to Henoko "was the only realistic decision." Yet 4,000 marines are going to be moved from Futenma to U.S. bases in various places of the Pacific Ocean, including Darwin, Australia, and Hawaii irrespective of the base relocation.
The first official summit in three years between Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihira Noda and U.S. President Barack Obama was held in Washington DC on April 30, 2012. The long pause was caused by the stagnation in Japanese-U.S. political relations, which started when the Democratic Party took office in 2009. Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama declared the priority of Asia in the country`s foreign policy as a counter-balance to the traditional policy of unconditional support to the United States on the international arena. Yet Hatoyama could not keep the promise of moving the Futenma base, which caused the worst cooling in Japan-U.S. relations in the entire partnership period.
The Japanese Premier Minister visited the United States during the escalation of a domestic political crisis in Japan linked with the tough confrontation between the ruling party and the opposition at the parliament, in which the sides appeared to meet on equal ground. The crisis extremely narrowed Noda`s chance for diplomatic maneuver and breakthrough decisions. Hence, the primarily objective of both partners was to remove the base relocation from the strategic agenda and make it "peripheral", at least to some extent. That would allow balancing the strategic relations and creating a sort of "nil balance" for offering a positive agenda at the next stage.
On April 27, shortly before the summit, the two governments issued a joint statement evaluating the roadmap of 2006. The document said that the base relocation must meet four criteria: be operatively efficient, politically viable, financially responsible and strategically significant[4].
The statement made an important addition to the previous document: the relocation plan was described as the only realistic solution "existent at the moment." In other words, the statement reserved the possibility of studying and approving other relocation options. Obviously, the formula is based on the clear understanding that in spite of public protests the Henoko base relocation (Camp Schwab) would not be "politically viable". Yet the indication of being the "only realistic solution", in the opinion of the newspaper Japan Times, mirrors official skepticism about the U.S. senators` suggestion that the base should be moved to Kadena[5]. Besides, the statement confirmed the upper limit of Japanese expenditures on the relocation of marines to Guam, at $2.8 billion, approved in 2009[6].
The U.S.-Japan summit resulted in the joint statement titled A Shared Vision for the Future, which has become the first document of the sort since 2006. The statement said that the Japanese-U.S. movement had developed into a comprehensive partnership contributing to peace and stability in the Asia Pacific region and described the military-political union as a cornerstone of peace, security and stability in the Asia Pacific region. The statement declared that Japan and the United States would implement their commitments through the broad use of possibilities in the provision of regional and global peace, prosperity and security[7].
The statement indicated the areas of bilateral security cooperation. Japan would develop dynamic defense, in which the Self-Defense Forces would strengthen their potential of early warning and intelligence in the area of Nansei and Okinawa. The policy was included in the fundamentals of the national defense program published in Japan in December 2010. The declared shift from basic to dynamic defense was supposed to give a more flexible answer to external military threats, including the growth of China`s military might, intensified activity of its Navy in the East China Sea and the missile and nuclear program of North Korea. The concept of "dynamic possibilities" prescribed the Japanese Self-Defense Forces to be ready to deter the broadest range of threats, such as terrorist acts, provocations and other forms of aggression both in traditional spheres (the sea and the land) and also in the outer space and the cyber-space. The program of the Self-Defense Forces modernization put the emphasis on strengthening the Coast Guard potential in the East China Sea in which China was presumed to deploy its modernized aircraft carrying fleet.
The statement published at the Japanese-U.S. summit of April 30, 2012, said that the United States would keep up to the plan of relocation of marine units in Okinawa, Guam, Hawaii and Australia to make their regional deployment more efficient in the operative respect[8]. Noda and Obama confirmed the agreement to relocate the base and move 9,000 U.S. marines from Okinawa, including 5,000 servicemen, to Guam[9]. Another step bound to reduce the U.S. bases strain on Okinawa was the agreement of the two leaders to close down five military sites south of the Kadena base and transfer the vacant land to its owners in three stages[10]. However, the lack of indications to a concrete plan of the Futenma base relocation in the summit final documents caused large discontent in Japan. That meant that the base would continue to operate for an indefinite period, which, in the opinion of many, was the worst-case scenario for Japan. Another source of discontent was the intention of the Japanese and U.S. governments, expressed in the joint statement, to energetically carry out the Futenma base modernization projects. The Japanese mass media said that the U.S. had presented an eight-year plan of the base modernization valued at $20 billion to begin in the fiscal year 2012.[11]
The crisis that had lasted in the bilateral relations for several years was overcome. By leaving the base relocation question open, Tokyo and Washington failed to get rid of the irritant in bilateral relations although through separating it from the troops pullout from Japan they managed to shift it to the background and make it a smoldering but not a burning conflict. The sides actually agreed to delay the base relocation project indefinitely, which allowed them to concentrate on primary tasks of the union development.
The tasks include the response to challenges related to the military and economic growth of China. Although the summit official documents did not describe China as a direct source of military danger, the Japanese premier and the U.S. president discussed issues of strategic cooperation within the framework of the Beijing "fencing" policy, including combination of financial resources of both states for creation of a system of combat training and joint exercises in Guam and one of the northern islands of the Marianna Islands. It was decided that a unit of the Self-Defense Forces would be permanently deployed on the Tinian Island for joint training.
The sides also discussed Japan`s transfer of several Coast Guard vessels to the Philippines. The issue became particularly topical after the escalated tensions in the South China Sea in April 2012 in the context of China`s territorial claims to the Philippines. Although the transfer of the ships contradicts the arms exports restrictions, it is allowed, when it is used to maintain peace and international security. Anyway, exports of military ships, same as assignment of military contingents outside of the Japanese territory for training, which were discussed at the summit related to the extremely sensitive question of interpretation of Article 9 of the Japanese constitution. The agreements show that the Tokyo policy of maximally free interpretation of the article, which has been on for more than two decades, remains unchanged.
Noda and Obama discussed the situation in North Korea, noting the importance of interaction to prevent new provocations of Pyongyang. They highlighted the abortive launch of the space rocket in April 2012. The U.S. and Japanese leaders confirmed the intention to develop cooperation in the security of nuclear reactors and alternative energy resources, using lessons of the Fukushima NPP nuclear accident cleanup. The Japanese interest in the United States as a nuclear power plant security partner is linked, apart from the Fukushima aspect, to the Japanese consideration of broader exports of nuclear technologies as an important part of its economic growth strategy.
U.S. nuclear guarantees remain a rather acute problem of bilateral relations. The North Korean missile and nuclear program and the Chinese fishing boat incident of September 2010 gave grounds for the increase in alarmist feelings of the Japanese public. The subject of the U.S. "nuclear umbrella", or, to be more precise, topicality of "nuclear guarantees", became one of the most widely discussed subjects of national security debates.
In the context of changed military-political conditions, many people in Japan ask a more general question of whether Japan could ensure its security with traditional methods, i.e. a military union with the United States. There have been certain suspicions about a possible change of the U.S. traditional policy of military unions with friendly nations and a chance of other steps that may change the regional balance of forces. To be more exact, there is a question whether the Americans use nuclear weapons (or threaten to use them) in the case of an attack on Japan, for instance, in a territorial conflict with China (about Senkaku) or armed provocations on the part of Pyongyang. In spite of verbal assurances of the U.S. administration, which have been made many times in the periods of presidency of George Bush and Barack Obama, there has been no firm answer, in the opinion of Tokyo. In other words, Japan has rather weighty grounds to doubt the readiness of the United States to take the risk of involvement in a nuclear conflict while defending interests of the allies in their territorial disputes with neighbors.
The question of U.S. nuclear guarantees also has a domestic political dimension for Japan. A key election promise of the Democratic Party of Japan, which won the election with a populist policy in 2009, was the crucial change of the Japanese place and role in the union with the United States towards bigger equality and openness. At the time of Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama`s Government, the Democratic Party administration disclosed secret agreements that had been reached with the U.S. in the 1960s on nuclear arms transit across the Japan. Japanese Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada presented public apologies in that connection in April 2010 and confirmed the invariable adherence of Tokyo to the three nuclear principles. Ambivalence of the Japanese approach to national defense issues was particularly obvious under these circumstances, being manifested with the existence of the so-called "nuclear dilemma."
This is a combination of two mutually exclusive concepts of the nuclear problem solution. On the one hand, Japan defines itself as a non-nuclear state bearing moral commitments of the world`s only country that suffered from nuclear weapons. On the other hand, Japan, which accepted U.S. security guarantees, actually recognized the legitimacy of the U.S. nuclear weapons use to protect itself from the external aggression[12].
The principles declared by the Democrats implied the abandonment of the covert agreements and the transfer of the entire military security policy into the field of public and legally flawless decisions. While formerly it was possible to settle delicate nuances of defense and military-technical cooperation with the United States (including nuclear aspects) in the non-public format, now any agreement between allies requires legalization as prescribed by public law.
There has been a trend of Japan`s gradual deviation from clauses of legislative acts that affirmed its peaceful status. It is not as much the matter of direct abandonment of Article 9 of the Constitution, by which Japan renounced war as a way of settling international disputes, as the interpretation of normative documents, principles and agreements serving as a follow-up of this Article.
The Americans believe that the obstacles impeding further development of the alliance consist in legal restrictions on the full-value military contribution of Japan to the union. On the whole, Washington has put up with the fact that it will be difficult to change the Japanese Constitution. True, Article 9 did not stop the assignment of forces on UN peacekeeping missions and anti-terrorist coalition in Iraq. The Japanese Self-Defense Forces recently commissioned the first in the post-war period military base outside of the national territory, in Djibouti. However, there are numerous opinions that Japanese peacekeeping missions could have been much more efficient if not for the tight interpretation of the constitutional provisions limiting their use of weapons to self-defense only.
The United States is particularly disturbed with the Japanese constitutional ban on "collective self-defense." Washington fears that this ban may cause Japanese passiveness in the development of collective security formats in the Asia Pacific region on which the United States stakes in the context of the military growth of China. Within the framework of its strategy of "fencing" China, the United States is seeking to create under its aegis several networks with intertwining memberships that would cooperate to resist the common threat (the United States - Japan - South Korea, the United States - Australia - Japan - India, the United States - the Philippines - Japan). One may expect bigger U.S. pressure on Tokyo for further alleviation of legislative norms limiting the country`s rights to "collective self-defense".
Another issue that causes U.S. discontent is the imperfection of Japanese domestic laws that regulate military aspects of Japanese commitments to the union. The regulations demand that engagement of the Self-Defense Forces in every operation shall require the adoption of a special law to be extended annually, which creates great inconveniences for military planning. For instance, the failure of the Prime Minister Shinzo Abe Cabinet to obtain the parliament`s approval of the law extending the anti-terrorist mission of the Self-Defense Forces in the Indian Ocean in 2007 led to a political crisis and resignation of the government and obstructed the fulfillment of Japanese commitments to the coalition partners. In the opinion of Washington, the legislative procedure of the involvement of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces in international operations is too complex compared with the procedures used by other allies, so the Americans keep telling Tokyo it is necessary to adopt a general law to legalize the sending of servicemen on extraterritorial missions.
New Trends in the Development of the US-Japan Military and Political Relations.
By D.V. Streltsov
Summary: The article addresses recent trends in the development of the US-Japan political and defense alliance, including the sphere of operational planning and coordination. A special attention is drawn to the problem of interaction between the two countries in the area of Ballistic Missile Defense, Japan`s procurement of American fighters F-35, as well as the issue of relocation of the Futenma base in Okinawa. The author sifts the results of the recent US-Japan Summit held in Washington D.C. on April 30, 2012.
Keywords
Security Treaty, Japan-US Alliance, Ballistic Missile Defense, Futenma military base, nuclear guarantees, Article 9 of the Constitution, the collective self-defense right.
[1] Dmitry Viktorovich Streltsov - Dr. of Science (History), Head of Department of Oriental Studies, MGIMO (U) of the MFA of Russia,, E-mail: d.streltsov@inno.mgimo.ru
Notes
[1] http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/05/02/japan_awakens
[2] Japan Times 22.12.2011
[3] http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/05/02/japan_awakens
[4]The Japan Times 01.05.2012.
[5] The Japan Times 01.05.2012.
[6] Mainichi Shimbun 02.05.2012.
[7]Yomiuri Shimbun 02.05.2012.
[8]The Japan Times 04.05.2012.
[9] Yomiuri Shimbun 02.05.2012.
[10] Mainichi Shimbun 02.05.2012.
[11]The Japan Times 01.05.2012.
[12] Japan: 50 Years of Liberal-Democratic Rule /Project Supervisor E.V. Molodyakova, M. 2010. - pg 212.
3 июля 2013 г.
