The article focuses on the role of the moderate Islamists association `The Muslim Brotherhood` in current political situation in Egypt. `The Muslim Brotherhood` is the most organized and powerful force in modern Egypt. The author deals with the ideology and the strategy of the association, the relationship with other political forces, internal differences and opportunities in power. He concludes that the `Cairo effect` triggered long overdue tectonic shift in the Arab region. Egypt has begun its move to build up a democratic state but with own specifics. The future situation in the country will depend on the relationship `The Muslim Brotherhood` with the army and political secular powers. The country has just started to move in the way that Turkey did a few decades ago.
The contemporary Islamic political landscape in the Middle East is unthinkable without the oldest moderate Islamic organization, the Muslim Brotherhood, founded in Egypt in the late 1920s. Its ideology and political philosophy had a large influence on the development of modern Islamism. Although Islamic movements in various countries operate independently and vary from the Muslim Brotherhood traditions, the Islamic association of Egypt has the broadest poly-variant approaches to relations with secular political forces and the authorities.
Evidently, accession to power in such a keynote country of the Arab world as Egypt makes an analysis of Muslim Brotherhood operations very topical. The political crisis that struck Egypt in February 2011 came as a certain surprise to the Muslim Brotherhood. The best scenario the Islamists had expected was a review through public protests of the outcome of the parliamentary election of November-December 2010 falsified by the authorities. The Muslim Brotherhood had to adjust its further agenda to the rapidly changing situation. After young protesters had seized Tahrir Square and the army had been brought to Cairo, leaders of the association took a median position. On one hand, the Brotherhood chose to go with the flow of revolutionary events and supported demands of the young and the liberal opposition (the resignation of Mubarak, the dismissal of the parliament and the lift of the state of emergency), while, on the other hand, some association members were hesitant and assumed a wait-and-see policy. Many activists of the youth wing of the Muslim Brotherhood largely acted on their own and stayed in touch with secular youth groups.
The association made a final choice to support Mubarak’s resignation when demands to topple the regime amid spreading chaos and massive public protests became obvious. In fact, it practically took the initiative and the lead in anti-governmental protests since February 2, 2011, and the attack of Mubarak supporters on the protesters on Tahrir Square. The association organized defense and food supply to the protesters and declared full mobilization of human and material resources, which changed the situation in favor of the protesters. Involvement of the Muslim Brotherhood in the revolution was rather limited at the initial stage (some observers say at first 20-25% members of the association were engaged), but Islamist forces played the main role in the revolution’s success at the final stage.
The victory of the Muslim Brotherhood’s party, Freedom and Justice, in the parliamentary and presidential elections was a natural consequence. The previous regime did not leave a single serious rival on the political field with purposeful marginalization of all secular forces. Islamism was the only way of self-actualization for a certain part of the politically active population. The Muslim Brotherhood managed to survive thanks to its experience of lasting co-existence with various types of regimes (monarchy of King Farouk, authoritarian republic of Nasser and semi-democracies of Sadat and Mubarak) and extensive social work inside various population strata.
In turn, the army played the main stabilizing role in the first months of the revolution; it prevented total collapse by giving in to the street protesters and the departure of Hosni Mubarak from the political scene. Actually, the generals did not have an alternative to the transfer of power to civilian authorities in the middle of 2012. There was an organized association of moderate Islam with the vast historical experience of public activity on one hand and a weak and disconnected secular bloc on the other. Obviously, the secular opposition needed some time to strengthen its positions under new circumstances. The military reasonably doubted the ability of liberal forces to save the country from full political breakdown. Left-wing ideas and liberal concepts, same as any secular political alternatives significantly lost their value in the eyes of the public in the office of the Mubarak regime, in particular, because of the open conformism and non-constructive position of their leaders.
The Muslim Brotherhood was the main target of harsh repressions by the Mubarak regime, which gave it the image of the main martyr to the tyranny and the fighter against its outrage. It must be noted though that the secular forces are actively recovering. There are signs of consolidation of the liberal camp around becoming more and more popular Mohammed elBaradei, Osama Al Ghazali Harb (leader of the Democratic Front Party) and Ayman Abd El Aziz Nour (former head of the Tomorrow Party), which have always presented a clear liberal platform. Amr Moussa, former Secretary General of the League of Arab States, is promoting a centrist politician image.
The complex socioeconomic conditions create prospects for left-wing forces and Nasserists, many of whom are popular politicians - Hamdeen Sabahi (leader of the Nasserist party Karama), Abu Al-Izz Al-Hariri (former member of the administration of the leftist party Tagammu) and George Ishaq (former co-leader of the protest association Kefaya) – able to unite various left-wing forces. These three men have the impeccable reputation of honest and committed politicians who did not give in to threats, blackmail or bribery of the former regime. They need to regain confidence of people in secular political values. The young politicians, who became known in the revolutionary events, may appear on the Egyptian political scene as well.
Development of the domestic political situation in the near future will depend on relations of the Muslim Brotherhood with the military and the secular political forces. Obviously, the top brass put certain hopes on the ability of the Muslim Brotherhood to stabilize the complicated situation in the country while preserving economic interests of the military. Most probably, the Muslim Brotherhood will try to keep balance between the military and the pressure coming from secular forces. The main task of the Islamists is to stop political turbulence and economic stagnation in Egypt. The association’s political strategy will depend on the internal situation in the Muslim Brotherhood, the outcome of the debate between “the conservatives” and “the reformists”, the framework of the declared policy towards the association’s reform under new circumstances and the search for compromises in combination of Islamization with democracy. The principles of democracy and civil society are a rather customary axiom for the Muslim Brotherhood. The association has a vast experience of interaction with secular political forces, same as the search for internal consensus.
The duality of the Muslim Brotherhood, which observers have been discussing lately, mirrors the historical nature of the association, which was established as a cultural phenomenon of the contemporary Islam and, simultaneously, a political force. The pragmatic political administration of the association has been traditionally trying to involve the entire Islamic spectrum of Egypt, both traditionalists and radicals, in the movement or accumulate the interests of the conservative part of Egyptian society into categories acceptable for modern secular society. The main role in this soft adaptation was played precisely by the conservative part of the association’s leadership, clerics and theologians. This means there will always be a dialog between the conservatives and the pragmatists in the movement, but it is essential that the Muslim Brotherhood has developed an ability to find compromises and to adapt to new conditions for 60 years of its existence.
But certain movement leaders may still use radical rhetoric to broaden their influence in the most conservative Islamic groups in order to gain eventual consent with the general policy of the Muslim Brotherhood targeting adaptation of Islamic law or its reform consistent with conditions of the new time. Another important issue is the reform of Islam, which started in the 19th century and kept going through the recent period and, most likely, would intensify in the near future. The Arab Spring created a favorable atmosphere to spur Islamic reforms. The claim, that the Arab Spring was no more than retribution of conservative Islamist forces sponsored by Gulf monarchies, does not look quite grounded.
The Arab Spring is rooted in the complex transformations of the Islamic civilization, attempts to adapt Islamic culture to modern globalization and combine conservative basics with modernism. These processes should not be mistaken exclusively for the threat of total Islamization. It is a new attempt of the Islamic-style rethinking of Westernization. The Muslim Brotherhood does not oppose modernization, it simply tries to avoid accelerated or aggressive modernization of the Islamic world and cautiously introduce reforms balancing conservative and modernist ideas, traditions and progress. This postulate of the Muslim Brotherhood expresses the interests of the conservative middle class and intellectuals supporting moderate democratization of Islamic societies and gradual political and social reforms based on religious values.
We are witnessing how Arab political Islam enters a stage of legal existence for the first time ever. Previously, in the majority of Arab countries Islamic moderate groups were experiencing permanent pressure of the government. The lack of access of Islamic organizations to the system, obvious violations of the legal opposition rights, the gap between the real potential and the influence of moderate political Islam and the capacity or willingness of the institutional system to integrate these forces curbed down the slow liberalization of political Islam. Conservative essence of Islam was enhanced in response.
The political leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood has been emphasizing the national nature of its mission of recovery from the political and economic crisis and stressing that the party was ready for a constructive dialog with all the secular forces. Modern ideologists of the movement believe that the Islamic state should be a guarantor of civil rights and freedoms. Avoiding the extreme individualism of the West and collectivism of the East, the Islamic system, in the opinion of Muslim Brotherhood, is offering a balance of rights of an individual and the society as a whole. Political concepts of the association reject theocracy the doctrine of which is incompatible with the Sunni principles.
Basic theories of the Muslim Brotherhood about the Islamic state envisage political engagement of the population, the ruler’s accountability to the parliament, supremacy of the law and equality of all citizens in the eyes of the law. All that is a part of fundamental democratic values. The concept of “Islamic democracy” in the interpretation of various theoreticians of the Muslim Brotherhood is spreading. Meanwhile, the Freedom and Justice Party has a prospect of competition with alternative Islamic movements of the Salafi and liberal trends[1].
The country retains a rather high level of conflict potential between secular and pro-Islamist forces, which will sporadically exacerbate to various degrees, depending on the political struggle or success of Egyptian democratization reforms. The Muslim Brotherhood and liberals have rather serious disagreement over forms of transitional period, pace of reforms and democratization, place of Islam in modern Egyptian society, and priorities of socioeconomic transformations. In fact, all the political forces declare the same goal – “building a democratic Egypt” – but their ideas of how to reach that goal are different. Besides, the secular camp has fears that dominance of conservative ideas supported by the administration of the Muslim Brotherhood may threaten Egypt with a new and more dangerous dictatorship under religious slogans. Some secular politicians do not share these fears and express the interest in cooperation with the Muslim Brotherhood believing that they are better than the radical Salafists who see no sense in any dialog with secular parties at all. Radical ideas of Ibn Taymiyyah and Sayyid Qutb would have prevailed if there had been no rationally minded Muslim Brotherhood, Political Science Prof. of the Cairo University Hassan Nafaa believes.[2]. Some even think that the Muslim Brotherhood would be invariably inclined to greater political pragmatism when in office.
Under these circumstances a lot depends on the ability of the Muslim Brotherhood to reach compromises if they have to make concessions. The objective wish to avoid a failure, in which neither international partners, nor financial donors nor the investors of Egypt are interested, may prompt the search for solutions between constructive secular and moderate Islamic forces. Meanwhile, constructive political forces of the country understand that more serious internal contradictions and destabilization may end up in the following: the power would bу taken by ultra-conservative religious groups, the former regime would be restored or even a military junta would take control. In that case no one would see “the light of democracy.” The presidential election of July 2012 showed the understanding of the situation, when secular political forces supported Muhammed Morsi, a candidate of the Freedom and Justice Party of the Muslim Brotherhood, in the second round of the election against his main rival personifying the former regime Ahmed Shafiq.
In the current political situation in Egypt characterized with a high level of democratic freedoms any ruling force will be under constant pressure of the opposition. Secular parties will take advantage of any political or economic flaws of the Muslim Brotherhood and force it to correlate Islamization boundaries with the declared policy of democratization of Egyptian statehood. At the same time, there is a conflict potential in the ambitions of certain forces and strata – former bureaucracy and business communities connected to the overthrown regime, apparatchiks of the People’s Democratic Party and certain parties of the political opposition. Disadvantaged people, unemployed youngsters who were naïve to think that the toppling of the former regime would bring prosperity, stayed discontent.
The factor of street pressure remains important in Egypt. The revolution goes on for certain youth movements, among them newly established organizations, and it will continue until the goals they have in mind are achieved. The main tactics of these groups is “street democracy” – manifestations and protests against any move of the authorities, they do not like. There are also demagogues and populists seeking power at any cost under the slogans of the Islamic threat or “a conspiracy” of liberals and the West against Egypt.
The capacity of the Muslim Brotherhood to solve the Salafi problem is another important question. The Muslim Brotherhood inherited the complex Salafi issue from the former regimes. Spots of Salafi Islamization in rural or urban areas have long become an inseparable feature of some Arab countries (Jordan, Egypt, Algeria and Yemen). Yet Salafism as a social phenomenon is a religion of active minority. The presence of Salafis is partially explained by the tolerance of former regimes which planned to oppose their influence to moderate Islamists. In fact, the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamic parties are operating in the extremely Islamized Arab social medium initiated by former nationalist regimes. It would suffice to remember that secular nationalist Anwar Sadat rather than the Muslim Brotherhood added a constitutional clause that affirmed the Sharia as the main source of national laws in the 1970s. The current problem is how to incorporate the Salafi factor into the civilized legal field under the formula “you may be a Salafi if you want, but no one will let you breach the Constitution.” This formula has been de facto existing in a number of Arab countries for ten years. The regimes were mostly guided with the tactics of repressive intimidation. Naturally, it may be adjusted now to the new realities, in which the dialog is prioritized over force. In this context the main question is how to prevent the spreading of Salafi enclaves and their transformation into a favorable environment for Al-Qaeda philosophy (the threat of this scenario primarily exists in Libya).
Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood so far manages to keep the Salafis within alliances or in the state of perpetual dialog. This may be explained partially with a higher level of organization of Egyptian Salafists, whose moderate movement has transformed into a party and taken relative control of various Salafi schools. Egypt does not have a problem Tunisia is facing. A serious factor of radicalization of Tunisian Salafis is the complex regional position of Tunisia, including transparent borders of post-conflict Libya, the adjacent unstable Sahara-Sahel zone and the difficult situation in Mali. All of these crucial regions are witnessing a growth in the activity of Jihad groups sharing ideas of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. There is an eventual threat that the terrorist activity would spread from these areas into Tunisia. The obviously transboundary nature of the problem needs the collective efforts to be taken through stronger cooperation of all the interested neighbors in North Africa supported by the international community.
At the same time, new Arab elites are inclined to a differentiated approach towards the Salafi problem due to the presence of radical and moderate elements in the Salafi camp. Deterrence of irreconcilable extremist groups is not a question of the dialog; it requires relevant measures to strengthen national security and improve professional skills of law enforcement authorities of a new Egypt. Force will be used only against utter extremists, and a serious political and theological dialog will be initiated or a system of checks and balances will be created in all the other cases.
One may even say that the Muslim Brotherhood and kin parties have successfully deterred the first wave of possible Salafization of the Arab Spring. There was a probability of accession of Salafi forces to power amid the political crisis and chaos in Egypt who urgently registered their parties and gained substantial financial support from abroad. Most probably, the Muslim Brotherhood factor will remain the only serious ideological barrier to new attempts of regional radicalizion in the transitional period, while main secular political forces have just begun to strengthen.
In the short-term prospect the Freedom and Justice Party has a complex task of building a dialog with all the large political forces of the country under new rules of political struggle and democracy. Key tasks of the transitional period include: а) elaboration of a legislative foundation for reforms; b) definition of the political model of Egypt; c) determination of the place of Islam in the new state and army of future Egypt; d) determination of the role of the president and the parliament, courts and the media in the political and state structure of the country, solution of complex socioeconomic problems[3], and fight against corruption. Unlike Tunisia, where the army returned to the barracks immediately after the revolution and volunteered to play no role in politics, the Egyptian military have traditionally played a role of an important national institute. In this light, Egypt may just take the path Turkey traveled along dozens years ago.
Sixty years of the rule of “military leaders” in Egypt have ended and the country has its first civilian president. The country had the first free multi-candidate election in May-July 2012 since the Revolution of July 1952. In contrast to Libya, which starts building its state structure practically from scratch without having any experience of democratic living, Egypt has always had civilian institutions (the parliament, parties, trade unions, free media and strong courts) although in a deformed way: it was so in the period of “parliamentary monarchy” of King Farouk, during the authoritarian rule of Nasser and the “guided democracy” of Sadat. On the whole, traditions of political pluralism and tolerance in Egypt are better developed than they are in the majority of other regional countries. The local Islamic movement has a long and vast experience of interaction with the government and other political forces, which will also help the sides adjust to each other.
All these issues considered, the transition to new statehood in Egypt will not be easy and may take quite a long time. Obviously, the purely Western democratic model is hardly suitable for the Egyptian mentality. The country will seek building democratic statehood with due account of its own cultural and civilization specifics. The Muslim Brotherhood position has been rather clearly formulated by acclaimed Egyptian public figure Fahmi Huwaidi, who stressed that recognition of democratic values, did not imply blind copying of all Western institutions implementing particular civil rights. Historical specifics of Islamic communities dictate the need for elaborating own models of democratic development.
`The Muslim Brotherhood` and Prospects of the Political Process in Modern Egypt.
By M.Razhbadinov
Summary: The article focuses on the role of the moderate Islamists association `The Muslim Brotherhood` in current political situation in Egypt. `The Muslim Brotherhood` is the most organized and powerful force in contemporary Egypt. The author deals with ideology and strategy of the association, the relationship with other political forces, internal differences and opportunities in power. He concludes that the `Cairo effect` caused long overdue tectonic shift in the Arab region. Egypt has begun its move to build up a democratic state but with own specifics. The future situation in the country will depend on the relationship `The Muslim Brotherhood` with the army and political secular powers. The country has just started to move in the way that Turkey did a few decades ago.
Keywords
`The Muslim Brotherhood`, the moderate Islamists association, situation in the Egypt in the post-revolutionary period, political reforms, the Salafi association
[1] Marat Zaurovich Razhbadinov– Ph.D. (History), Second Secretary at the Russian Foreign Ministry Department of the Middle East and North Africa, freelance expert of the MGIMO (U) of the MFA of Russia Center for Partnership for Civilizations. Е-mail: nolk2001@mail.ru
Notes
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[1] Political evolution goes on inevitably in the Islamic community where neo-Liberal forces, among them former associates of the Muslim Brotherhood open to a broad dialog with secular parties, are appearing.
[2] Modern Salafi are actively using concepts of medieval theologian Ibn Taymiyyah. Extremist groups have borrowed certain radical ideas of Sayyid Qutb.
[3] Economic growth slowed down to 1% in February-May 2011 because of political instability, industries lost 10-20 billion Egyptian pounds, tourist business incomes dipped 80%, foreign investment stopped, and Egyptian gold and gold and foreign exchange reserves decreased from $36 billion to $28 billion.
