23.05.25
A.A. Kokoshin
Abstract – The article covers the prospects of relations between China and the United States compared to the relations that have taken place between the superpowers of the United States and the Soviet Union. A comparison of relations between the two pairs of superpowers is made in the article based on the following parameters: the interaction of the superpowers in economic and financial sectors, the struggle for the world’s mineral resources, relations in the strategic nuclear sphere, naval rivalry, relationship in the land theaters, and conflicts in cyberspace.
One of the biggest issues of mid-term and especially long-term forecasting of the development of the world political system and the world economy is relationship between the United States and the emerging second superpower, China. China’s rise is faster than it seemed to many Western and Russian researchers in previous years. As has been noted, in particular in the last prognostic report of the National Intelligence Council of the United States “Global Trends 2030,” “a thorough investigation of the four previous reports shows that we have underestimated the rate of change” (author’s note: in China) [1]. There are estimates that suggest in the midterm that the growing capacity of China in relation to the United States will begin to slow down significantly at some point [2; 3]. At the same time, there are forecasts that deal with the fact that, in the next 18–20 years, China will have much larger GDP compared with the United States; at the same time, it will yield to the United States in product per capita by a factor of only two. As for the military power, according to a number of estimates, somewhere between 2020 and 2030, China will surpass the United States in defense spending [3, p. 7–8]. Western analysts indicate that, in recent years, statements from officials of the People’s Republic of China for more active and largescale objectives for the People’s Liberation Army of China (PLAC) began to sound more striking. In one of his speeches before the command staff of the PLAC, Chinese President and General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPC, Xi Jinping said that China “should be able to win the war” [4]. The “White Book” on issues of the defense of the State Council of China refers to the fact that the PLAC could ensure victory in a local war if necessary. [5]
The United States remains the world leader in science and technology; however, due to the huge efforts made by Beijing in science and technology, in 15– 20 years, the situation may change significantly in favor of the People’s Republic of China. One of the most important indicators of achievements of China in the last 5–7 years has been the results that they have achieved in high-performance computing and supercomputing, both fields in which China has a number of parameters very close to the United States, which, 10 years ago was regarded as the undisputed leader in this field, leaving behind all of its competitors (excluding Japan).
A few years ago, several well-known American figures proposed a project called “Group of Two” (G2) that planned a duumvirate of the United States and China in world affairs, especially in the financial and economic spheres. This proposal was politely but firmly rejected by Beijing. Instead, some Chinese leaders proposed to use the relatively amorphous C2 formula, where the letter “C” means “coordination” [6]. Later, the Chinese government proposed that, with respect to Sino–American cooperation, “a new type of relations between the major powers” be established; this means a policy that eschews conflict and confrontation in favor of principles of mutual respect and mutually beneficial cooperation. [7] Many American politicians and experts raise the question of how this Chinese formula will actually be implemented and what the inner content of this rather general formulation will be.
In general, we can assume that future relations between China and the United States will be characterized by a particularly high level of uncertainty with the most direct impact on the degree of strategic uncertainty in relation to the system of the world politics and the world economy as a whole. Reducing this uncertainty is one of the most important prognostic problems.
A comparison of a number of important features that characterize the interactions of the superpowers of the Soviet Union and the United States with a new pair of superpowers can serve as one of the approaches to predicting China–United States relations. This approach would identify the similarities and differences in the relationship of these two pairs, which will help to form a clear idea of the future dynamics of China–United States relations.
The results of this comparison can be used for a more detailed and comprehensive forecasting of future relations between China and the United States using all sorts of methods and techniques.
Nature of the conflict in the ideological sphere. The Soviet Union and the United States have proven to be frank antagonists in the ideological sphere, which is a direct consequence of the radical differences in their political and economic systems.
Ideological motives played a very significant role in the external and, in some cases, the military policy of the Soviet Union. For its part, the United States, claimed to be the undisputed “leader of the free world” and actively promoted its own ideologies, which also had a direct impact on American foreign and military policy.
In official speeches of modern Chinese leaders there is no pronounced negative attitude to capitalism or to political systems of Western countries. In ideology and political practice the People’s Republic of China very prominently presents recognition of market relations and of private ownership of the means of production. At the same time, party and state leaders of China consistently stress that in socialist society “with Chinese characteristics” is being built in this country.
New Chinese leader Xi Jinping introduced his contribution to the state and party ideology of China and, in particular, proposed the formula of the Chinese dream, i.e., “the great renaissance of the Chinese nation.” [8] To implement the Chinese dream, as Xi Jinping noted, “we must ensure that people are entitled to equal participation and development and to the protection of social equality and justice….” [9].
The level of ideological expansion of China (Communist party of China, CPC) is relatively low compared with the fact that it took place in the Soviet Union (CPSU) abroad. The United States continues to claim “moral leadership in the world” and pretends to be the main force for promoting democracy based on the American model.
In the United States, the issue of human rights in China, the “undemocratic” Chinese political system, etc. is raised regularly. Attempts by the United States to interfere in China’s internal affairs are severely suppressed by Beijing. A significant part of the Chinese “political class” and of the intellectuals of China believes that the main long-term aim of the United States toward China is the radical transformation of its political system in compliance with Western standards, as well as the destruction of China’s territorial integrity.
In the Chinese media, in speeches by many Chinese scholars close to the governing party and public authorities, there have been a significant number of extremely negative statements against Western political systems, Western ideology, and Western values.
The differences between the political systems of China and the United States are almost as high as they were between the Soviet Union and the United States, although China’s political system is more flexible and mobile than that of the Soviet Union. Nowadays, China’s political system of China is not one-party; however, in the presence of several parties (which was recorded even when creating the People’s Republic of China in 1949), it is dominated by the 85 million members of the CPC [10, p. 139–147]. An important part of China’s political system is the direct leadership of the Communist Party of China by the Armed Forces of China. Xi Jinping stresses the importance of “ideological construction” in order to create the most mod ern and powerful armed forces in China [4].
In his time, Mao Zedong stated that the “political power grows out of a rifle.” With all the evolution that has taken place in the political system of China, this formula will be very important for China in the coming decades. At the 14th seminar of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee on April 26, 2014, Xi Jinping noted that, under the conditions of the new political environment, there are growing threats and challenges to national security and social stability in the country due to outside forces, which many Chinese Analysts understand to refer to the United States.
Interactions of superpowers in economic and financial spheres. The Soviet Union and the United States was characterized by the almost complete absence of economic relations and direct conflict in the economic sphere. The Soviet economy essentially had a self-sufficient character. The foreign economic relations of the Soviet Union developed mainly within the group of countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). The dollar was the world’s currency. The ruble was used for internal calculations between the socialist countries in the CMEA.
During the period of relaxation, attempts to develop Soviet–American bilateral relations were almost blocked by influential political forces in the United States (including the Jackson–Vanik amendment, which survived the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War).
China and the United States have a very high level of economic interaction (interdependence): they have large volume of mutual trade and investment; by April 2014, the volume of foreign exchange reserves in China is estimated at 3.8 trillion USD, and almost one-third of these reserves (1.27 trillion USD) was invested in government securities of the United States [11].
Presence of high level of economic interdependence can generate more conflicts that can move to the political level. Washington regularly imposes various restrictions on the activities of the various Chinese companies in the United States, including in the interests of the national security of the United States (one of the examples was the restrictions on the activities of the Chinese telecom giant Huawei).
The People’s Republic of China leaders have made great efforts to transform Shanghai and Hong Kong (Xianggang) into the world financial centers. According to a number of expert evaluations, in 15–20 years they may become alternatives and serious rivals to New York and London.
Struggle for the world’s minerals resources. As for the provision of natural resources, the Soviet Union was a completely self-sufficient state with great export potential. Direct competition between the Soviet Union and the United States and its allies for sources of minerals was minimal. During the Cold War, a great dependence of the US on foreign oil sources was designated, which has become one of the most important factors in American national security policy. To a considerable extent, this justified the formation of largescale military presence in the Middle East, especially in the Persian Gulf. This also had an impact on the Soviet foreign and military policy.
China has a progressively increasing demand for imported raw materials, including oil and natural gas. According to some estimates, this trend will continue for at least the next 20–25 years, even if China vigorously develops the field of shale gas and shale oil. There is increase in competition between China and the United States and its Western allies for access to mineral resources (especially in Africa). In 2013–2014, a new phase in the use of China’s armed forces in peacekeeping operations began, which appears in areas of China’s increased activity in the struggle for access to mineral resources.
Primarily due to the active use of technology in shale gas and shale oil, there is the prospect of self-sufficiency of the United States to provide a hydrocarbon feedstock. In 2013, the United States became a net exporter of a number of petroleum products, including gasoline, diesel fuel, etc., for the first time since 1949. The self-sufficiency of the United States in providing hydrocarbon feedstock may be dominant consequences and economic and financial, as well as political–military and military–strategic, reasons. This may also result in the somewhat reduced relevance to the immediate national security interests of the United States in the Persian Gulf, with an increase in the role of the latter for China.
Relations in strategic nuclear sphere. Relations in the strategic nuclear sphere between the Soviet Union and the United States played a dominant role in the global military-strategic balance; they went through a series of major crises, including the Caribbean crisis in 1962 (in the United States, it is called the Cuban missile crisis) [12, p. 4–12]. Ultimately, Moscow and Washington have worked out the basic principles of strategic stability that have been codified by the end of the 1980s. Since 1972, a series of United States–Soviet (then Russian–American) agreements was reached on the limitation and reduction of strategic offensive arms. These agreements include carefully worked out and quite detailed verification procedures that affect the provision of the necessary level of trust between the two parties. The Soviet–American Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of 1972 played a significant role. As is well known, the administration of US President George W. Bush withdrew from the ABM Treaty in 2002, which increased the degree of uncertainty in the nuclear field and reduced the level of bilateral and global (due to the proportion of the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Russian Federation) strategic stability.
The United States and the People’s Republic of China have a huge asymmetry in the size of strategic nuclear forces (SNFs) in favor of the United States. At the same time, there are no bilateral agreements that relate to restrictions of the corresponding arms. Washington and Beijing have no agreed principles of strategic stability. Many Western and Russian experts have noted the high level of uncertainty regarding the com position of the People’s Republic of China’s strategic nuclear forces and their deployment; according to Beijing’s intentions, this works to ensure the proper invulnerability of Chinese strategic nuclear forces in the face of the American strategic nuclear forces and nonnuclear, high-precision, long-range weapons. In the People’s Republic of China, the dominance of the United States, not only over China, but also all the other major (and even smaller) countries, in high-precision long-range weapons (sea or air) based on the global intelligence and information and communication structure must be taken into account. Here, there is a high probability that the United States will remain superior for the next 20–30 years.
According to many estimates, the PLAC has a significant number of nuclear weapons of tactical and operational-tactical purpose, which are not properties of the intercontinental range. However, these nonstrategic nuclear weapons play an important role in various regional balances of power, including in relation to the military presence of the United States in areas close to the territory of the People’s Republic of China, and the armed forces of direct military allies of the United States.
The continuation of efforts increase in the area of the United States strategic and nonstrategic ABM, which are not limited (as it was until 2002) by the Soviet–American ABM Treaty of 1972, is cause for growing concern in the People’s Republic of China. There is some growing apprehension that, at some point, the American AMB capabilities will significantly reduce the credibility of China’s nuclear deterrent against the United States, while Beijing maintains the same level of strategic nuclear warheads and nuclear delivery vehicles as are currently available.
The principle of the nonuse of nuclear weapons is first recorded in the declarative part of the military doctrine of the People’s Republic of China. In the official military doctrine of the United States and the National Security Strategy of the United States, there is no such provision.
Central strategic nuclear balance is maintained in the hands of the Russian Federation and the United States, which surpass the People’s Republic of China by far in their arsenals of strategic nuclear forces. For several decades the leaders of the People’s Republic of China, who followed the precepts of Deng Xiaoping’s “to keep a low profile” ahead of time in the nuclear field, were quite satisfied with this situation. Will this position and status, as well as political and military reasons, still satisfy the second superpower of China in 10–15 years? We can assume with high probability that it will not.
In the last 10–15, years the People’s Republic of China created new systems for both ground-and sea-based SNFs, as well as new industrial and scientific-technical bases for deploying the largescale production of all components of the strategic nuclear forces. There are active discussions about the transformation of China’s strategic dyad in the triad through the creation of a full-fledged air component of the strategic nuclear forces with bombers of intercontinental range.
Competition in sea areas. In the 1960s–1970s, the Soviet Union made an attempt to challenge American dominium maris achieved in the Second World War. Apart from the fact that the Soviet Union had rapidly developed the marine component of strategic nuclear forces, the construction of the Soviet Navy envisaged a set of measures to neutralize American air strike groups (CSGs), which were the main means of America’s projected force in various parts of the world. In particular, this applied to a number of water areas immediately adjacent to the territory of the Soviet Union. At some point, there was a serious threat of random incidents at sea between the Soviet Union Navy and the United States Navy with the potential armed conflict of the superpowers. The Soviet-American agreement on preventing incidents on the high seas and airspace above it (1972) was concluded, which had great practical importance. As a result of the agreements on the limitation and reduction of strategic offensive arms between the Soviet Union and the United States, restrictions of no small importance were imposed on the strategic missile submarines – carriers of nuclear missiles (ballistic missiles of submarines).
In the last 10–15 years, on the sea direction, there was a significant promotion of activities of People’s Liberation Army of China (PLAC). In a number of accounts, the contours of the corresponding component of the political and military strategy were identified in the late 1980s [13, p. 7–10]. China has carried out selective naval policy aimed at achieving the Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan and the disputed islands in the South China and East China seas; to ensure the safety of sea communications of China in a number of marine waters (Strait of Malacca); to increase the combat stability (invulnerability) of the marine component of the strategic nuclear forces of the People’s Republic of China using the general-purpose forces of the PLAC Navy and others. The growing military capabilities of the People’s Republic of China in the East China and South China seas will increasingly face the growing capacity of the American Navy and Air Forces and their allies in these and adjacent waters. One sign of this is, e.g., equipment of Japan Self-Defense Forces with aircraft carriers and helicopter carriers.
For many politicians and experts in the United States, China, and other Asian and Pacific countries, it is obvious that the disputed territories in the East and South China seas have great potential for conflict.
For a number of years, the PLAC implemented measures to neutralize America’s strike aviation groups (SAGs); a combination of nonnuclear weapons of the Second Artillery (in many respects analogous to the Soviet and Russian Strategic Missile Forces), the PLAC Navy, and PLAC Air Forces. With operational– and military–technical points of view, these measures of the PLAC differ significantly from steps undertaken at the time of the Soviet Navy toward neutralizing the SAG of the United States Navy. According to many estimates, in the last 2–3 years, the corresponding group reached a new level in the ability to keep the American SAG at arm’s length, not only from the shores of China, but also from Taiwan.
At the same time, Washington is not abandoning attempts to maintain its dominium maris [14, p. 163–172].
A number of Western experts have noted that there is growing operational and strategic instability in the region of Taiwan as a result of the desire of both parties to take preemptive action in the case of armed conflict. In the midterm, this instability is offset by a significant improvement in relations between Beijing and Taipei, which took place in recent years due to the fact that, in Taiwan, the politicians in power hold the separatist position. In the case of a change in political power in Taiwan, a new operational-strategic reality that appeared and developed in this area can appear in a different way.
State of affairs in land theaters. Unions headed by the superpowers of the United States and the Soviet Union, including the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) and NATO, were characterized by an exceptionally high level of confrontation in Europe, as well as general-purpose forces. An important role in this confrontation was played by tactical and operational-tactical nuclear weapons.
For a long time, the United States and its allies saw nonstrategic nuclear weapons as means of compensating for superiority in conventional forces, which, according to the West, had the Soviet Union and its allies in Central Europe. The United States targeted a relatively early use of tactical nuclear weapons in case of success of the WTO forces in offensive actions.
There has hardly been any direct confrontation between the ground forces of the People’s Republic of China and the United States. The United States and the People’s Republic of China have no land theater that would be analogous to Central Europe in the relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. In the People’s Republic of China, there is a certain level of confrontation of the ground forces and air forces with India and Vietnam, who are not American allies; however, in principle, this is compensated for by normal political relations between the People’s Republic of China and these countries. In the last 20 years, the confrontation between the ground forces of the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation, who share the world’s largest common land border, is reduced to a very low level (this process began before the collapse of the Soviet Union).
Conflicts in cyberspace. In the 1970s–1980s (not to mention earlier periods), cyberspace was only in its infancy compared to what it has become in the past 10–15 years. A confrontation took place in the electronic sphere between the Soviet Union and the United States. This applies primarily to the electronic warfare (EW), mainly in the military dimension. Extensive measures were implemented to intercept telephone conversations, data transmitted on the radio, jamming the radio (the Soviet Union), etc. Echelon, the well-known American system of electronic surveillance was created during the Soviet– American confrontation and, according to many reports, is still active in the modern world.
Cyberspace has developed rapidly. This is an extremely complex, multicomponent sphere remains a largely unrecognized phenomena, particularly from political and military–strategic points of view. Actions in cyberspace are characterized by a high degree of anonymity. The United States regularly brings suits against China in a variety of actions against American interests in cyberspace. In many respects, due to the China–United States conflict in cyberspace, real or imagined, there is a high level of strategic mistrust between these countries with a huge conflict potential.
CONCLUSIONS
The author must deal with a variety of estimates and judgments from the experts, scientists, politicians in different countries, i.e., Russia, the United States, the European Union, the People’s Republic of China, India, Indonesia, and others, about how relations between the People’s Republic of China and the United States will develop up to 2030 and beyond. Many analysts have expressed serious concerns about the fact that relations between the two superpowers will at some point be dominated by the conflict points, including serious political and military conflicts. There is another point of view that a high level of economic and financial interdependence of the United States and China will be an important constraint on the behavior of both superpowers in conflict and crisis situations. Of course, a number of other countries will play an important role in the relations between the United States and China, including Russia, India, Japan, and EU member states. Furthermore, the special role of Russia is noted, with its vast natural resources, territory, and nuclear missile arsenal comparable with the United States, as well as its political influence in many regions of the world, including where there is a conflict of interests of the United States and the People’s Republic of China.
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Translated by S. Avodkova
ISSN 10757007, Studies on Russian Economic Development, 2014, Vol. 25, No. 6, pp. 581–585. © Pleiades Publishing, Ltd., 2014.
Original Russian Text © A.A. Kokoshin, 2014.
