By V.O. Pechatnov[1]
Using less-known documents from American and British archives the article examines the impact of developments on Soviet-German front in late 1942 on the military-political planning in the U.S. and U.K. with a special emphasis on the second front problem. It demonstrates how deeply the German defeat at Stalingrad affected the Anglo-American military and intelligence estimates of situation at the Soviet-German front and prospects of the war in general.
The Second Front problem is one of the most well explored issues in the national and international literature on the diplomatic history of the Second World War. Nevertheless, there are some gaps formed as a result of, on the one hand, the Russian researchers` insufficient knowledge of documents from the Anglo-American archives, and on the other hand, as a result of involuntary concealment of the "uncomfortable" ones by our Western colleagues, which tend to gravitate to a smoothed down version of diplomatic struggle on this issue. This article is intended to fill one of those gaps based on the analysis of how the Battle of Stalingrad influenced the military-political plans of the Allies.
On September 27, 1942, when fierce fighting was already underway on the outskirts of Stalingrad, the Kremlin gave a dinner in honour of an important American guest - the leader of the Republican Party Wendell Willkie. One of Willkie`s companions proposed a toast to "the unknown ordinary Russian soldier on whom the eyes of the world are now focused."[1] Stalin added that "the ordinary Russian soldier is now deciding the destiny of the world". In a personal conversation with Willkie he bluntly said that the Germans "can take Stalingrad."[2] Willkie wrote in his report on this conversation that Stalin "did not make any predictions about Russia`s ability to stand out and most definitely said that neither the love for the Motherland, nor the bravery of soldiers can save the nation, because the outcome of battles is determined by the numerical strength, skills and equipment."[3] So what was decided at Stalingrad, was not only for our country, but also for the whole world? To answer this question it is useful to compare the huge military and political consequences of the victory at Stalingrad (which are well known) with the likely consequences of a reverse outcome of the great battle (of which, like about any might-have-been events in history, practically nothing has been said).
Here we enter the realm of alternative history. It is unknown whether the Soviet Command had plans in case of defeat at Stalingrad, but the U.S. Command, accustomed to consider all possibilities, had such plans, as the documents of the U.S. military archives show. Back in late June, President Roosevelt and his main aide Harry Hopkins started to discuss the variant of defeat of the USSR in the strategic offensive launched by the Wehrmacht. The materials of this discussion were destroyed, but maybe that particular discussion spurred the elaboration of this issue by the military, which by the beginning of August prepared for the Joint Chiefs of Staff a special study entitled Strategic Policy of the United Nations and the United States on the Collapse of Russia (JCS-85).
It considered possible defeat or "critical weakening" of the Red Army. By "critical weakening" it meant the collapse of the Eastern Front and the release of at least half of the Wehrmacht forces on this front. The study made a conclusion that any of these scenarios would lead to a fatal geopolitical shift in the balance of forces of the warring parties - the "fall of Russia would be a disaster," which would put the United States in a "desperate situation." Continental Europe would be entirely lost for the Allies, because the liquidation of the Soviet-German front would make it impossible to open the second front. The only thing that the Allies would be able to hope for then, was retaining the British Isles, however, a sharp growth in pro-German sentiment in the ruling circles of the country, the fall of the Churchill Cabinet and a possible separate peace treaty with Germany was expected there as well. Having subjugated the natural and economic resources of the USSR, Germany would become almost invincible in a direct military confrontation.
The collapse of the USSR, according to the JSC-85 forecast, would affect the whole world:
- the Resistance movement would come to naught;
- the British Empire will fall apart (except for Canada, Australia and New Zealand);
- pro-German sentiments would rise in Latin America and the Middle East;
- the linkup of the German and Japanese armies in the Middle East (the main nightmare of the Anglo-American planners) would cut the Allies off the oil resources of the region;
- the United States would be enclosed in the Western Hemisphere and would move onto the defensive.
In light of such a gloomy prospect, the report even considered the possibility of the signing of a separate peace with Germany or with the two leading countries of the "Axis." However, this possibility was rejected, as in this case "the United States would lose its position of the leading power and in the future would find itself in front of the Axis countries with no allies." Such a radical geopolitical isolation of the United States, as the report emphasized, would have a detrimental psychological impact on American society. Therefore, to counter the isolationist and defeatist moods the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee offered to prepare in advance a set of measures in order to "mitigate the impact of such trials on the American public and to prepare it for such a turn in the war."[4] It seems that such a scenario of the geopolitical consequences of the Soviet-German front collapse was quite realistic, especially since the U.S. planners were not at all inclined to exaggerate the importance of the Soviet-German front and the Soviet Union`s role in the war. The report was approved at a meeting of the JCS on September 8, 1942. However, since the Committee members stated that "the collapse of Russia still does not seem imminent," it was decided to put it on the shelf, keeping it a secret even from the closest allies - the British.[5]
They, however, had their own, somewhat more optimistic forecasts of the developments on the Soviet-German front, but they also did not exclude the possibility of the Red Army defeat. "We consider a major success of one of the parties hardly achievable by August," said a June report The Possible Course of the Russian Campaign and Its Implications made by the Chiefs of Staff Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), entitled, - "however, between August and October the events may reach their climax. Both sides will suffer huge losses ... The German High Command by that time may face a choice: to throw its last reserve troops into the battle - even at the expense of the dangerous devastating of the occupied countries with a view to achieving the complete defeat of Russia before the onset of winter, or to keep its reserves for countering the growing Anglo-American threat in the West. The margin between success and failure may be very thin, and even minor factors can determine which of the two opposing sides will collapse first. "The JIC leadership generally agreed with this assessment, but noted that it was "too rosy for Russia."[6]
The question naturally arises: why, given such extremely high stakes regarding the fate of the Soviet-German front in the summer and autumn of 1942, did not the Western Allies make more active efforts to help prevent a possible catastrophe? After all, the above mentioned British intelligence report recognized that "the extent to which the Germans will have to divert forces (from the Eastern Front - V.P.) to counter the threat of Anglo-American offensive in the West" will be a factor in the outcome of the summer offensive of the Wehrmacht.[7]
In May, Roosevelt and Churchill in talks with Molotov, as it is known, promised (although with Churchill`s reservations) to open the Second Front in Europe (Operation Roundup). However, at the Anglo-American meeting in London in July, the British resolutely insisted on the refusal from this plan, and even from Operation Sledgehammer - the landing of 6-10 divisions in northern France in autumn 1942 with a view to divert at least some of the Wehrmacht forces from the Eastern Front. In a debate with the British and in the report for Roosevelt, the U.S. delegation continued to defend its position. "Russia is the most important at this stage factor of the war and therefore, our estimation should be made depending on the outcome of the current Russian campaign," the report said. "Defeat of the Russian armies will make us fully reconsider the Allied strategy. It would practically eliminate any possibility of the defeat of Germany in a direct confrontation and force the Allies on a permanent defensive throughout Europe."
If the Soviet-German front stabilizes, Operation Sledgehammer, the U.S. military believed, would get good chances for success - for keeping a foothold in Normandy before the big invasion in 1943 and the diversion of additional German forces from the Eastern Front. In case of an imminent threat of the Red Army defeat the risk of sacrificing several divisions still would be justified, compared to a much greater risk. "We would be responsible for a major military blunder," they warned the President, "if we allow Germany to liquidate the eight million-strong Allied army at a time when our attacks could have saved the situation."[8] However, the British stance prevailed, and Roosevelt joined it. Instead of the Sledgehammer in the autumn of that year, it was planned to land the Allied forces in North Africa - Operation Gymnast (renamed Torch). The U.S. Command in their internal assessments regarded this operation as a kind of a "pinprick," which "will be only dispersing the Allied forces, postponing a large invasion of the European continent, and at the same time will not really help the Soviet Union." It was noted that, even in the event of success, this operation is "not likely to result in the redeployment from the Russian front of even a single German soldier, tank or airplane."[9]
Churchill, who was reassuring Roosevelt that the Torch is "a real second front in 1942,"[10] among his entourage also admitted that this operation cannot replace the promised Second Front: the "Torch" - it`s only 13 divisions, while we were preparing to move 48 divisions against the enemy in 1943, he wrote to the leadership of General Staff on November 18, 1942."We have made it clear to Stalin that in 1943 there will be a great invasion of the continent, and now are planning 35 divisions less than we expected in April-July, or slightly more than one quarter. It makes no sense to close the eyes to this and imagine that the difference will not be noticed."[11]
The Torch, apart from failing to provide immediate assistance to the Red Army, also created additional problems for it, although the success of the Allies in North Africa directly depended on the continuation of Soviet resistance. The lend-lease supplies to the USSR were curtailed because of the Torch needs. What is more, in July London made a decision to cancel the 18th Arctic convoy because of the large losses suffered by the previous convoy (the ill-fated PQ17). In September, without the approval of the Soviet side a large batch of the Airacobra fighters, intended for the Stalingrad front was removed from the next - 19th caravan. However, they were requested by the U.S. Command for the Torch needs. This caused understandable indignation in the Kremlin especially considering its desperate need for the aircraft like these.
On September 20, Stalin wrote in a telegram to Soviet Ambassador in London I.M. Maisky: "I regard the behaviour of the British regarding the Airacobra issue as sublime impudence. The British had no right to redirect our cargo at their discretion without our consent. The British side`s reference to the fact that the redirection has occurred at the request of America is jesuitism. It is not difficult to understand that the United States acted at the request of the British."[12]
Churchill post factum explained to Stalin the origin of this decision, but, apparently, the latter did not believe in the innocence of the British. Moscow took these decisions of the Allies as a double default - on the commitment to supply the USSR with materials by the northern route, and to open the Second Front in 1942. Thus, Maisky summed up the events in a telegram to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, "at the most critical moment for us, we were entirely abandoned by our allies." "The ambassador named the two main reasons for the inactivity of the Allies: `the desire to see the mutual exhaustion of Germany and the USSR` and the `Anglo-American top brass` fear of the military might of Germany.`"[13]
Maisky recommended Stalin "to bluntly raise the issue of the convoys and the Second Front with Churchill, stressing that our people do not understand the passivity of England in such a terrible time for us, and that if a Second Front is not opened in 1942, the war may be lost, or at least the USSR will weaken so that in the future it will not be able to take an active part in the fight." In other words, Maisky proposed to shake up the Allies with the warning of the same two possibilities of "Russia`s collapse," which were considered in the JCS-85. The ambassador`s recommendation was accepted, although Stalin`s reply, according to Maisky, turned out to be "a little bit softer than I suggested,"[14] as the Kremlin chief would not threaten the Allies with his defeat.
The message said: "... I could not imagine that the British Government would refuse to supply to us war materials now, when the Soviet Union especially needs the war materials at a time of severe tension on the Soviet-German front. ... As for the Second Front in Europe, I am afraid that this issue is beginning to take a frivolous nature. Proceeding from the situation on the Soviet-German front, I have to say most emphatically that the Soviet Government cannot accept the postponement of the Second Front opening in Europe until 1943."[15]
The text of this Stalin`s message was sent for reference to the Soviet Ambassador to the United States M.M. Litvinov in Washington, D. C. In a response telegram to Molotov the ambassador suggested that this message should also be brought to the notice of Roosevelt as a warning to both Allies: "I think that without the hint of a threat it is impossible to stir up Churchill and the military. The Americans and the British believe that a situation in which the Germans are beating and forcing us back would be ideal, as long as no matter where, at least in Western Siberia, there is a front that is attracting German forces until they, in a year or two, having achieved significant superiority in aircraft, are able to launch the offensive. We should be weakened so as not to speak loudly at the conclusion of peace. Therefore, as a next step I would directly threaten with consequences of the current Anglo-American strategy, and would place on them the responsibility for these consequences."[16]
No doubt, the veteran of Soviet diplomacy very well grasped the main meaning of the Allied strategy, for which not so much the location of the front as its very existence was really important. Back in July 1941, Churchill wrote to his naval commanders: "The benefits that we get, if Russia manages to resist and continue the war at least until the onset of winter, are innumerable. As long as they fight ... it is not so important where the front line is."[17]
Litvinov`s recommendation to go further on the path of threatening warnings to London and Washington, in fact, repeated the advice of Maisky. It is interesting that a similar proposal those days was made also by Hopkins in a conversation with Maisky on July 22. The Soviet ambassador described it as follows: "Mr. Hopkins in a manner of `thinking aloud` began to ask the question: "Would Comrade Stalin right now, during the London meetings send to Roosevelt a strictly personal message, describing the danger of the situation and stressing the importance of the immediate opening of a Second Front." However, when I bluntly asked Hopkins whether I should understand his words in the sense that he considers it desirable to send such a message, Hopkins made a helpless gesture and said, "I don`t really know." Despite all this play, it was evident that Hopkins considered it desirable to send such a message."[18] It is quite possible that thus Hopkins with the help of Stalin wanted to stimulate his hesitating boss to more actively support Operation Sledgehammer. Because it was on July 22, when the Anglo-American military talks in London reached a deadlock because of the Britain`s refusal from this operation. However, Stalin did not follow the advice of Litvinov and Hopkins, limiting himself to just denouncing the actions of Churchill whom he regarded, not without reason, as the main person responsible for the Second Front opening delay.
But let`s return to the motives of the Western Allies. The reasons for their passivity in direct combat with the Wehrmacht at that stage of the war are quite obvious in general. In 1942 yet they had not sufficient forces for a massive invasion of the European continent. It is unlikely that Sledgehammer would have diverted significant German forces from the Eastern Front, although it could have created problems for the Wehrmacht in the longer term. In addition, the British had to bear the brunt of this operation, but they were strongly against such self-sacrifice and used their strategy of wearing down the enemy by bombing and attacking the weak spots, especially - the famous "soft underbelly" of the Axis countries in the Mediterranean.
The foundations of this UK strategy had been laid down back in July 1941. The Chiefs of Staff Committee`s General Strategy report stated: "The German army is so strong that even if the Russians manage to hold the Eastern Front, it will be able to meet us in the west with such forces that we will not be able to defeat, given the current state of German combat readiness and spirit. First, we must break down the foundations on which this military machine rests - the economy supplying it, the spirit that supports it, the supplies that nourish it, and the hopes for the victory that inspire it. Only then we will be able to return to the continent, occupy and take under control the territory of the enemy and impose our will on it."[19] In the future, the British Command led by Churchill was consistently following this strategy.
Roosevelt sought to prevent the Anglo-American rift on the "big strategy" issues and could not ignore the position of Britain. However, in these matters he allowed Churchill to "tow" him (as Litvinov put it),[20] also because he wanted to avoid major losses associated with the Second Front. Such losses in ground operations with no guarantee of complete success were fraught with major internal political complications and threatened to undermine that relatively sparing model of military mobilization, which was the basis of the administration`s approach to the conduct of war. According to the plans of military production (Victory Program), adjusted at the beginning of 1942, already that year America was to produce 45 thousand aircraft, 45 thousand tanks and 20 thousand anti-aircraft guns.
Only after that it was planned to launch the US massive entry into combat in the main - European theatre. "In this case," emphasized the General Strategic Concept of the military planners, "there will be no need in disrupting the economic life of our country by the abrupt withdrawal of labour from the industry, transport, agriculture, etc. Instead, we will focus our main efforts on the Air Force, naval and amphibious forces, which will not require immediate mobilization of an enormous number of people."[21] Instead of 215 divisions, planned by the U.S. Command within the Victory Program as the necessary level for the defeat of Germany, the United States ultimately used less than a hundred divisions.
There was no need in total mobilization, as long as (as Roosevelt wrote to Churchill in 1942), "Russian are killing more Germans and destroying more military equipment than we taken together."[22] It is not surprising that Counsellor of the USSR Embassy to the United States A. Gromyko in his letter to the NKID (People`s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs) wrote referring to the White House`s attitude to the Second Front (August 1942) that Roosevelt "lacks vigour" in this matter and that "it would be possible to make the Americans launch immediate practical preparations for the opening of the Second Front, perhaps, only if the British took a hard line for the opening of the Second Front any time soon."[23]
As for the threat of collapse of the Soviet-German front in the autumn of 1942, the intuition told both Roosevelt and Churchill that the Soviet Union would withstand. This psychological aspect is somewhat underestimated by some historians, although it is the "mood of the day," the perception of the current situation of that time by the leaders that largely determined the nature of their decisions. "I firmly believe that Russia will hold out this winter," the president wrote to the prime minister in October.[24] Churchill even in August during conversations with Stalin (as he later told Maisky) "did not see and did not hear a single word or gesture, not a slightest hint that Russia could not withstand and lay down arms. The iron will and total uncompromising attitude to Germany."
The visit to Moscow, Maisky wrote to Stalin, has further strengthened Churchill`s belief that "the Soviet Union, even in the worst case, will endure somehow," that "the Soviet Union has a strong back."[25] It`s not a coincidence that Maisky called this belief the "underlying cause" of the whole Churchill`s policy. (Such irreconcilability of the Kremlin made another nightmare scenario for the Allies - a separate peace between Germany and the USSR (such as the Brest Peace Treaty) a highly improbable event. In September, Churchill came to the conclusion that "Hitler`s campaign against Russia in 1942 will become a major disappointment for him,"[26] and in November he put into question the supposition of the Joint Staff of the possible "Russia`s withdrawal from the war": "What are the reasons to believe that Russia will withdraw from war?" he said angrily, adding that "the military experts of Great Britain and the United States are always wrong about Russia."[27] It is not surprising that for the Western Allies their own risk of major losses seemed more serious than the so far hypothetical collapse of the Soviet-German front.
This plain selfishness, intensified desire to save its people, so natural for the democracy, was regarded by Moscow as something worse: it was perceived through the prism of increased ideological suspicion as a deliberate policy for attrition and weakening of the Soviet Union. Even the "Westerners" Maisky and Litvinov reportedly were no exception to this rule. Not to mention Stalin who in October 1942 telegraphed to Maisky: "We all in Moscow have the impression that Churchill is heading for the defeat of the Soviet Union, in order to collude later with Hitler`s or Bruening`s Germany at the expense of our country."[28] Maisky dared to disagree with the leader, arguing that the defeat of the USSR runs counter to the UK interests, although objectively it might become the consequence of its policies. Stalin partly agreed with the analysis of the experienced diplomat, but remained convinced in the hypocrisy of the British leader: "Churchill apparently belongs to the type of the leaders that easily make promises and also easily forget about them or even flagrantly break them ... Well, now we know what kind of allies we are dealing with."[29]
Stalin regularly briefed the Allies on the situation at Stalingrad, and often did so himself, not trusting his main co-author in correspondence Molotov. For example, on October 3, he wrote to Churchill about the deterioration of the situation, stressing the superiority of the Germans in military equipment, especially in the air.[30] On October 8 Churchill informed Stalin about the new suspension of the Arctic convoys, this time - until January 1943, explaining this by the bad weather and the needs of Operation Torch. Maisky had warned Anthony Eden about the seriousness of making such a decision at a time when decisive battles were being fought at Stalingrad, back on September 27.[31] Churchill sought to smooth over the effect of the convoys` cancelling by other initiatives aimed at helping the USSR:
- Repeated proposal on the deployment of the Anglo-American forces in the Caucasus (Operation Velvet);
- Partial response to the Soviet request for the additional Spitfire fighters;
- Implementation of Churchill`s favourite idea of an operation in northern Norway (Jupiter).
However, all these proposals did not meet the Soviet requirements for the Second Front. When Litvinov in a meeting with President Roosevelt on October 7 reminded him about this discrepancy, the president remarked "that all allegedly recognized that landing in Europe is impossible." "I asked," Litvinov continued in his report, "if the president believes that the landing is not possible at all. He replied that it would be possible when the enemy is weakened. I pointed out that in the case of a lull on the Eastern Front, Hitler will transfer forces to the west and then the landing will be even less possible than it is now. The President was not convincing to say that they are doing what is practicable and that Hitler will also feel a planned blow from the flank."[32]
Just as Churchill, Roosevelt sought to at least partially compensate for the delays with the Second Front with additional supplies of military equipment, especially fighters. In his letter to Stalin on October 11 the President promised to deliver additional 300 aircrafts, which he with difficulty solicited from his military. On October 13 Litvinov wrote from Washington: "With regard to supply, I got the impression that the President would want to maximally satisfy our needs and thus compensate for the absence of a Second Front. But here he is also entirely in the hands of his generals and admirals who more and more make demands for allegedly meeting the Americans` own needs."[33]
In October, Stalin`s correspondence with the Allies became rare and very concise. Churchill was particularly offended by Stalin`s response of October 13 to his two long letters dated 8 October: "I received your message. Thank you." London could not find an explanation for this enigmatic answer without seeing the obvious - a critical situation at Stalingrad that left no time for other things. It was in those days that combat actions at Stalingrad plants erupted with unprecedented force, developing into hand-to-hand fighting that was not stopping day or night. The analysis of Stalin`s archive shows that even these concise runarounds were drawn up hastily, handwritten by Molotov and were only approved by Stalin.[34]
Some stabilization of the situation at Stalingrad by mid-November in combination with the successful launch of Operation Torch eased the tension in the allied relations that had increased in September-October 1942. Stalin, who had previously doubted the success of Torch has welcomed its encouraging start. The tone of his correspondence with Churchill became noticeably warmer. The prime minister acted in a reciprocal manner. In a draft message, dated November 22, he even planned to share intelligence information available to him on the results of the Soviet troops` offensive at Stalingrad obtained during Operation Magic - the deciphering of Wehrmacht radio communication with the use of an intercepted German secret code. According to these data, the Paulus army received an order to take up the defensive and strengthen its western flank.[35] The British Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Churchill to remove this paragraph as it has lost its relevance in connection with further developments on the front and also because of the special secrecy of the source of that information "that you so jealously guard."[36] The message remained undelivered.
The main thing left for the Allies to hope for in autumn 1942 was that the Soviet soldier and the Red Army withstand the terrible onslaught of the German war machine. "A large-scale attack on Europe occupied by Germany may be undertaken no earlier than 1943," it was admitted in an internal report of the U.S. military delegation on the results of the London talks with the British. "Thus, Russia will remain virtually alone facing all the might of the German nation until the winter interferes again. During this period, the fate of the rest of the Allied world will mainly depend on the resistance and fighting efficiency of the Russian army."[37]
The British counterparts echoed the U.S. military. "At the present time," stated the Chiefs of Staff report on American-British Strategy as of October 30 - "the Russian army is the only force that can defeat or at least contain the German army. Britain and America cannot hope to challenge the main forces of the Axis on land. ("I hope Stalin will not see it," the prime minister inscribed against this paragraph[38]). In the event of Russia`s collapse Britain and America will not only be unable to launch new overseas operations, but also with great difficulty will be able to fulfil existing commitments. It is quite obvious, that it is the war in Russia, that faster than anything is undermining the German might. In other words, the Russian army is not only the main means of defeat of the Wehrmacht on the ground, but also the main factor contributing to Germany`s wearing down. Therefore, it is extremely important to encourage the Russian resistance by increasing the volume of deliveries, by military operations against Germany in the air and in the sea, possibly by involving Turkey in the war and operations in the Caucasus (Operation Velvet was meant - V.P). Our operations in 1943 in Europe and in the Pacific should be conducted with taking into account their contribution to the continuation of Russian resistance."
As for the large-scale assistance to Russia, the plans of the British Command were still based on the wearing down strategy: "Despite the fact that a large-scale invasion of Europe would be the greatest assistance to Russia, we have to conclude that the only option for us is to undermine the German military might by the destruction of Germany`s industry and economy for such invasion. The primary means of achieving this goal, in addition to Russian ground forces, will be heavy bombers in combination with tight blockade and operations with the aim of the maximum stretching of the enemy forces. "Accordingly, only limited landing operations in Sardinia and Sicily were planned for 1943, and the possibility of a massive assault in the north of France was planned not earlier than 1944."[39]
Fortunately for the "Allied world," the Red Army not only resisted, but also launched all-out offensive at Stalingrad. And the turning point that has begun to take shape in this great battle immediately affected the assessment of the situation by the military-political leadership of the Allies. On the eve of the Soviet counter-offensive Churchill criticized the plans of his military for 1943 as too negative. Keeping within the "soft underbelly" strategy he nevertheless believed that a successful start of Operation Torch (8 November 1942) would allow the Allies as early as in 1943 to invade the main territory of Italy or the south of France. The Prime Minister said the Russian factor is one of the main reasons to strengthen the Allied action: "It is hardly possible to believe that the Russians will be satisfied with us lying around through 1943, while Hitler will make a third attempt to crush them."[40]
However, the military stood their ground, and on November 29 - ten days after the start of Operation Uranus - Churchill was even more categorical responding to a new report on the future strategy of the Chiefs of Staff Committee: "Your paragraph 11 is tantamount to the rejection of a determined effort to open the Second Front in 1943. I believe that we need to plan an attack on the French coast in the area of the Channel or the Bay of Biscay, and July 1943 should be set as its approximate date. Based upon the situation on the Russian front, Hitler is unlikely to be able to transfer considerable forces from the east to the west. Besides, now he also has to keep track of the southern flank of France. Battles on the Russian front have already seriously affected the situation and can change it radically."[41]
Finally, in a special note to the military command of December 2 Churchill gave a detailed assessment of the new situation on the Eastern Front and its implications for the plans of the Allies. "The recent extremely important events have been changing the base data for our vision on both sides of the Atlantic. The Russians were not crushed or weakened in the 1942 campaign. On the contrary, it was Hitler and the German army, that suffered heavy losses and were defeated. ...The destiny of the great battle that is going on at Stalingrad has not been decided yet, but it is likely that the Russian attack would have far-reaching consequences for the German might. If the sixth German army, surrounded at Stalingrad, is destroyed, the Russian offensive on the southern flank could reach its goal - the liberation of Rostov-on-Don. In this case, the status of the three German armies that are staying in the North Caucasus and have already been restrained by the Russians may seriously and irreversibly deteriorate, and that would have incalculable consequences. The Russian offensive in the central sector and their counterattack all along the front lines can make the Germans withdraw to the winter positions. Winter will bring to the weakened German forces new major hardships, despite the fact that they now have a better railway system than before. By the end of 1942 we will be able to make one very definite conclusion - in 1943 no considerable transfer of German troops from the Eastern to the Western theatre of war will take place (italics in the text - V.P). It is a fact of paramount importance."[42]
Churchill, as we can see, quite accurately predicted the future developments on the Soviet-German front. Indeed, the great victory at Stalingrad created favorable opportunities for the intensification of the Allied military action against Germany. It`s another matter how they took advantage of these opportunities. The final stage of the Battle of Stalingrad coincided with the Anglo-American conference in Casablanca (January 12-24, 1943). The Conference decisions reflected the key priorities of the Britain`s strategy:
- a focus on further operations in the Mediterranean (Operation Husky for the invasion of Sicily);
- build-up of forces in the British Isles for the subsequent landing on the European continent;
- intensification of bombings of Germany;
- priority of the European theater of operations over the Pacific.
The Second Front plans for 1943 were not cancelled yet, but, the military planners in both countries well understood, the continuation of the Mediterranean strategy was hardly compatible with a large-scale invasion of northern France. The wings of "Bolero" (the codename of the buildup of forces in the British Isles for the invasion of the Continent - V.P.) and Roundup have already been scorched in the Torch flame," Head of the US strategic planning group General A. Wedemeyer summed up the meeting results. "When in Casablanca, it was decided to continue the Mediterranean operations, I knew that the crossing of the Channel in 1943 for the ultimate defeat of Germany ... will fall through."[43]
In February, the Allied offensive in North Africa broke down, which threatened to finally disrupt the opening of the Second Front in 1943. "All this smells bad," Maisky wrote in his diary. "Operations in Tunisia are dragging on because of the recent defeats of the Americans. It is unlikely that they will end before April. Hence, the operations in the Medi [terranean] will be launched no earlier than June-July. The operations are not easy ones. They probably will also be dragged and above all, I guess, will not go smoothly. The attention of the British will be focused on sending reinforcements somewhere in Sicily or the Dodecanese. Shipping facilities will be busy delivering supplies thousands of miles away from England. The Brit(ish) govern(ment) will be delaying, trying, deferring the operation to cross the Channel... What will come out of the Second Front?"[44] As it is known, in 1943 the Second Front really did not work out; even the landing of forces in the south of France, which was proposed by Churchill at the end of 1942 had to be given up.
The defeat of the Germans at Stalingrad was marked by warm congratulations of Roosevelt and Churchill to Stalin. "Churchill was totally overjoyed and even moved by the Red Army," Maisky reported on his conversation with the UK Prime Minister on February 9 after Operation Uranus. "When he talks about it, tears appear in his eyes. Comparing Russia of the last war with the Russia (i.e. the USSR) of the current war, Churchill said: "All things considered, I believe that the new Russia is five times stronger than the old one." Slightly bantering with Churchill, I asked him half-jokingly: "How do you explain this phenomenon?" Churchill replied in the same tone: "If your system brings happiness to the people, I am for your system. However, I have little interest in what happens after the war ... Socialism, Communism, cataclysm ... If only the Huns were defeated."[45]
However, the victory at Stalingrad evoked not only emotion in the West. Despite Stalin`s absence in Casablanca, "the growing Soviet power, embodied in the Stalingrad victory," in the words of American historian W. Kimball, "was like a ghost in the basement - hidden from view, but on everyone`s mind." "After Stalingrad," he continues, "the prospect for the defeat of the main forces of the Wehrmacht by the Red Army alone without the help of the Allies shaped up."[46] The resonance of the end of the giant battle on the Volga was so tremendous that the Chiefs of Staff Joint Intelligence Committee assessed the new situation on the Soviet-German front as follows: "Whatever the intentions or plans of Germany, we believe that the time has come to recognize that the defeat it suffered in Russia is probably irreparable. It created for its Russian campaign the largest and most sophisticated military machine ever. This machine was beaten and damaged to the extent that it is unlikely to be restored ... We believe that a situation may arise (and we should be prepared for it), in which Germany would not at all be able to stabilize and hold the front line in Russia. If this happens, the organized German resistance in Russia may collapse."
Further, the report forecasted the geopolitical implications of this collapse:
- Germany will by all its forces be trying to contain "the invasion from the east" and may open a front in the west (up to "inviting" the Anglo-American troops) in the hope to conclude a separate peace with the United States and the United Kingdom;
- the European satellites of Germany will be one after another dropping out of the war;
- Romania and Bulgaria will fall under the control of Moscow, etc.
On February 22, 1943 the Chiefs of Staff Committee agreed "in principle" with the basic content of the report, but made a reservation that it "probably paints a too optimistic picture. It is too early to predict with certainty the course of further operations in Russia."[47] Indeed, this assessment turned out to be too optimistic, but the very fact of a radical revision of the previous attitudes of the Allied intelligence is significant: just in some six months, the expectations of "the defeat of Russia" gave place to the forecasts of the collapse of the German war machine. Such was the optical effect of the Battle of Stalingrad. Soon the debate in the Western capitals on the issue of "Russia`s ability to withstand" will be replaced by arguments about how the Soviet Union may dispose the fruits of its impending victory. But that`s another story.
The Battle of Stalingrad and the Second Front Problem
By Pechatnov V.O.
Summary: Using less-known documents from American and British archives the article examines the impact of developments on Soviet-German front in late 1942 on the military-political planning in the U.S. and U.K. with a special emphasis on the second front problem. It demonstrates how deeply the German defeat at Stalingrad affected the Anglo-American military and intelligence estimates of situation at the Soviet-German front and prospects of the war in general.
[1] Vladimir Olegovich Pechatnov - Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor, Head of Department of History and Politics of Europe and America, MGIMO (U) of the MFA of Russia.
Key words
World War II, the Battle of Stalingrad, Soviet-German Front, Second Front, Stalin, Roosevelt, Churchill.
Endnote
[1] From Moscow to MILID, September 27, 1942 // United States Military Intelligence Reports. Vol.2. The Soviet Union, 1941-1944. Ed. by P.Kesaris. Bethesda, 1984-1985.
[2] Transcript of Comrade Stalin`s Interview with Willkie, 23 September 1942 // The Battle of Stalingrad and its Geopolitical Importance / under general editorship of Sergei Naryshkin, Acad. A.V.Torkunov. Moscow: MGIMO - University, 2013. P.370
[3] W.Willkie. One World. N.Y., 1943, P.36
[4] Strategic Policy of the United Nations and the United States on the Collapse of Russia, August 7, 1942 (JCS-85) // National Archives, College Park, Maryland (hereafter - NA), Record Group (hereafter - RG) 165, ABC 384, USSR (6-1-42); Measures in Event of Russian Collapse in 1942. Joint Psychological Warfare Committee, June 1, 1942 // NA, RG 218, Geographic File, 1942-1945, CCS 334 JPWC (3-18-42).
[5] JCS 32nd Meeting, September 8, 1942 // NA, RG 165, ABC 384, USSR (6-1-42).
[6] The Possible Course of the Russian Campaign and Its Implications, J.I.C. (42) 200 (Final), June 1, 1942, P.10; Hollis to Prime Minister, 5 June, 1942 // The National Archives, Kew Garden, Richmond (hereafter - TNA), The Prime Minister Office Papers (hereafter - PREM) 3/395/13.
[7] The Possible Course of the Russian Campaign and Its Implications, P.10.
[8] Offensive Operations in 1942-1943. Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes of 28th Meeting, June 20, 1942 // NA, RG 218,Geographical File 1942-1945, CCS 334(5-26-42); Memorandum for the President, July 28, 1942 // NA, RG 165, Top Secret General Correspondence (Entry 15).
[9] Memorandum for the President (n.d.) // NA, RG 165, ABC 381(9-25-41), Sec.VII; Notes on the Letter of the Prime Minister to the President of June 20, 1942 // Ibid.
[10] Churchill & Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence. Vol. 1-3. Edited by W.Kimball (hereafter - Churchill & Roosevelt),. Princeton, 1984, Vol.I. P.520.
[11] General Ismay, for C.O.S.Committee, 8.11.42. // Churchill Archive, Cambridge University (hereafter - CHAR), 20/67.
[12]Stalin to Maisky, September 20th, 1942 // Soviet-British relations during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. Documents and materials. Moscow, 1983. Vol.1. P.286
[13] Maisky - NKID, July 16, 1942 // Documents of the USSR Foreign Policy (hereafter - DVP), Vol. XXV. Book 2. Tula, 2010. P. 58-59.
[14] I.M. Maisky. Diary of a Diplomat. London, 1934-1943, Book 2, part 2: June 22, 1941-1943 Comp. Y.A. Nikiforov, L. Pozdeyeva, O.A. Rzheshevsky, Br. Ed. A.O. Chubaryan. Moscow: Nauka, 2009. P.165.
[15] Correspondence between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Presidents of the United States and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. (hereafter - Correspondence). Moscow, 1957. Vol.1 P.54.
[16] Litvinov to Molotov, July 23, 1942 // Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (hereafter - AVP RF), fund 059, inventory 1, file.368, folder 2568, sheet 110.
[17] Gilbert M. The Churchill War Papers. Vol.III. The Ever-Widening War 1941. London, 2000, P.921.
[18] Maisky - NKID, July 22, 1942 // DVP. Vol. XXV. Book. 2. P.75
[19]General Strategy. Review by the British Chiefs of Staff. July 31, 1941 // Library of Congress, H.Arnold Papers, Military Subjects, Box 202; see also: A.Danchev. Indirect Action Strategy // Allies in the War. 1941 1945. Exec. Ed. A.O. Chubaryan, U. Kimbell, D. Reynolds. M., 1995.
[20] AVP RF, fund. 06, inventory 5, folder 28, file 327, sheet 7
[21] Broad Strategic Concept for Allied Nations (n.d.) // NA, RG 165, ABC 381 (9-25-41), Sec.VII.
[22]Churchill & Roosevelt, Vol.I. P.441
[23] Gromyko - NKID, August 14, 1942 // US-Soviet Relations during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. Documents and materials. M. 1984.Vol.1. P.229-230.
[24] Churchill & Roosevelt, Vol.I. P.643
[25] Maisky - to Stalin, October 23, 1942 // Internal use only. Vol. XXV, Book 2. P. 298
[26] Churchill to Wavell, October 7, 1942 // CHAR 20/81..
[27] Notes by the Prime Minister on C.O.S. (42) 345 (0) (Final) // TNA, PREM 3/499/6.
[28] Stalin to Maisky, October 19, 1942 // Soviet-British Relations during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. Vol.1. P.294.
[29] O.A. Rzheshevsky. Stalin and Churchill. Meetings. Conversations. Discussions: Documents, Comments, 1941-1945. Moscow, 2004. P. 378.
[30] Correspondence. Vol. 1. P.68
[31] Eden to Kerr, 28th September, 1942 // TNA, Foreign Office 954/3A.
[32] AVP RF, fund 059, inventory 1, folder 369, file 2509, sheet 39
[33] Litvinov - NKID, October 13, 1942 // US-Soviet Relations during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. Vol. 1. P. 252-253.
[34] Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History, f.558, inv.11, case 257, l. 93
[35] Prime Minister to Premier Stalin, 22nd November, 1942 // TNA, PREM 3/393/7.
[36] CIGS for Prime Minister, November 23, 1942 // Ibid.
[37] Memorandum for the President, July 28, 1942 // NA, RG 165, Top Secret General Correspondence (Entry 15).
[38] "American-British Strategy", October 30, 1942 // TNA, PREM 3/499/6.
[39] Ibidem.
[40] General Ismay for C.O.S. Committee, 9.11.42 // Ibid.
[41] General Ismay for C.O.S. Committee, 29.11. 42 // Ibid.
[42] Note by the Minister of Defence, December 2, 1942 //TNA, PREM 3/499/7.
[43] Wedemeyer A. Wedemeyer Reports! N. Y., 1958. P.192.
[44] Maisky I.M. Diary of a Diplomat. London, 1934-1943. Book 2, part 2. P.227-228.
[45] Maisky to NKID, February 9, 1943 // AVP RF, 059a, inventory 7, folder 13, file 6, sheet 222, 224. First published in the "New Documents from the Archives of the Russian Foreign Ministry" // International Affairs. 2001. No 8. P.68-70
[46] Kimball W. Forged in War. Roosevelt, Churchill, and the Second World War. Chicago, P.190
[47] The German Military Situation. Report by the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, February 15, 1943; The German Military Situation. Report by the Chiefs of Staff, February 22, 1943//TNA, CAB 66/34.
