The appearance and rapid increase in non-nuclear strategic weapons have become the chief new factor influencing the international correlation of military-political forces. Alas, this factor is overlooked sometimes. Meanwhile, these weapons determine the level of armaments and military hardware and vectors of the art of war. This is primarily happening in the strategic area, in which the nuclear deterrence strategy of the past decades is being reconsidered drastically. A new stage of the military- technical revolution is the core of these transformations.
The issue must be taken into consideration, in particular, at negotiations on the limitations and reductions of weapons. The opinion of renowned French expert Jean-Bernard Pinatel is noteworthy in this connection: "Strategic superiority is no longer limited to classic military might for the United States. New information and communication technologies have revolutionized military affairs. And that is not a surprise. Combat success has always directly depended on the ability to coordinate efforts of reconnaissance units with conjectures about moves of enemy forces. The new information and communication technologies open up truly revolutionary vistas for these capacities[2]".
What revolutionary vistas, first and foremost, in the military-political area, should be expected with the appearance of the phenomenon of non-nuclear strategic armaments and hardware? Primarily, this is the question of change of the very attitude to military force as a military-political instrument. The new role of non-nuclear armaments will apparently make military force again a "regular-use" instrument of foreign policy, principally, in regional or even "local" conflicts.
In addition, tactical notions of the art of war have already changed drastically. In fact, the war of "big battalions" is a bygone. Massive use of the Army is an anachronism; instead, there are "aerospace information" strikes followed by operative "clearing" of territories. There is a strict list of priorities, and political and military command centers become primary targets. In November 2012 Israel destroyed half of the Hamas political and military command and missile launchers (including protected ones) and intercepted the rest with the Iron Dome missile defense system within one day only. "Presently, in the early 21st century, the development of information and communication technologies allows to be constantly aware of whereabouts of one`s combat units, up to a single solider and even monitor in real-time his condition and injuries and even provide him with remote medical attendance through "nano-capsules" from his uniform, which is steadily turning into "a second skin"," Jean-Bernard Pinatel observed justly.
Essential changes in the role of non-nuclear weapons began at the start of the new century, which attributed qualities of strategic offensive and defense weaponry to them in certain cases. First of all, this is the question of high-precision weapons - cruise missiles, aircraft, attack drones, air-to-surface missiles and air defense/missile defense systems. There are at least three new features:
- firstly, mass production of high-precision weapons and their use in military conflicts. It will suffice to say that high-precision weapons accounted for less than 10% of all armaments used in the Desert Storm Operation, about 100% in the operation against Yugoslavia and nothing but high-precision armaments were used against Libya. There are all grounds to believe that non-nuclear precision weapons will become the main means of hostilities and a main foreign policy tool;
- secondly, mass production of non-nuclear weapons has been accompanied with the sharp reduction of production costs and transformation of precision weapons from an exotic means of war into a regular, "routine" and mass weapon. Naturally, that had an effect on the scale of production and development of non-nuclear weapons. The United States is expected to have dozens or even hundreds of thousands of cruise missiles in the medium-term future. There may also be mass production of attack drones and hypersonic aircraft, as well as various types of air bombs and missiles. Mass production of precision weapons will inevitably lead to automation, robotization and, in general, transfer of control to automatic algorithms independent from political decisions;
- thirdly, precision weapons became a rapid "proliferation" abroad and stopped being the privilege of the United States and Russia. Even so, a number of countries, such as France and Israel, became its leading producers. As a result, destabilizing consequences of the appearance of precision weapons are projected not only on the relations between great powers but also on the regional level.
All these consequences have a negative influence on political stability and use of military force in international relations. That happens especially on the strategic level, on the level of capacities of defensive armaments. One more circumstance deserves to be mentioned: precision weapons develop simultaneously with the development of efficient air defense and missile defense systems and blend them into a single whole. The Israeli war against Hamas in November 2012 showed that the military-political command and offensive weapons, even on protected positions, could be destroyed with precision weapons and that missile defense could intercept up to 90% of attacks, which leads to the attainment of the main military goal, the enemy "disarmament". Certainly, this does not necessarily mean a political victory, which is defined not only by military results (as it happens in the case of the Palestinian-Israeli war of 2012) but, obviously, these predetermine political victory.
These and other changes of the military-technical and economic dimensions of the development of non-nuclear weapons unavoidably influence the methods of their use, and what is more, the entire military strategy of states. Some estimates show that non-nuclear strategic weapons are already capable of destroying up to 30% of strategic nuclear forces of Russia and 100% of China, and the trend will continue to edge up in the medium-term future in spite of the deterrence measures. In fact, the sides that have a superior potential of precision weapons have become able to launch a "disarming" (strategic by its consequences) strike. The aforesaid is directly related to the military policy of the United States and its NATO allies, who have drastically enlarged the scope of precision weaponry outputs for the past ten years.
It is also directly related to aerospace defense, which has not only integrated the aerospace into a single whole but has also expanded its boundaries to national or even regional scales. It is now impossible to be sufficed with the protection of just one territory, locations of either intercontinental ballistic missiles or military commanders or political administration. It seems to be necessary to plan the deployment of aerospace defense of the entire country, or, which is more realistic, many regions and, in the future, aerospace defense of the CSTO and the CIS. The decisions made in Ashgabat in December 2012 confirm this policy.
There is another important feature of mass production of strategically important precision weapons. We were witnessing a rocketing increase of U.S. exports of military products, among them, precision weapons, in the past decade. According to official data, governmental programs alone had the following value:
2002 - $10 billion;
2007 - $18 billion;
2008 - $28.5 billion;
2009 - $29.9 billion;
2010 - $24.4 billion (the global economic crisis);
2011 - $32.9 billion;
2012 - $51.6 billion[3].
Therefore, official exports of the United States alone have grown by more than five times within only ten years. This fantastic growth has many reasons, primarily, the increased significance of precision weapons, air defense and missile defense systems for the national security. With the aerospace and information space transforming into a single theater of operations, it makes the former division of armaments into strategic, operative-tactical and tactical, nuclear and conventional, land-based and seaborne useless. National security becomes integral. Naturally, the proliferation of precision weapons outside the national territories, including the neutral waters of the World Ocean, signifies a quality change in the global strategic situation. Besides, it plays into the hands of the country that promotes such weapons outside of its national territory.
This situation creates numerous problems, amongst them:
- the seaborne component of U.S. precision weapons and missile defense that has been growing at disproportionately rapid rates;
- allies and territories where precision weapons are based. Apparently, this potential of precision weapons should also be included in the analysis of correlation of forces;
- negotiations or deliberate restrictions on proliferation of precision weapons and aerospace defense systems outside national territories;
- limitation of military activity in the outer space and certain regions of the world (such as neutral waters).
Meanwhile, the development of non-nuclear precision weapons has reached such a level that a gradual replacement of nuclear deterrence with non-nuclear deterrence has been given serious consideration on the military level. The discussion has not been shifted into the political dimension so far although there is an objective need for that. Russian experts present this opinion in the following way, "It seems that non-nuclear precision weapons play a positive role by contributing to the reduction of the role of nuclear weapons and, consequentially, their reduction. There is an opposite trend, as well. Superiority in conventional armaments of some states prompts other states to obtain nuclear armaments to preserve their sovereignty and hold an independent policy, which undermines fundamentals of the nuclear non-proliferation regime[4]".
There is a lasting impression that the United States not only purposefully uses its military-technical superiority by shifting the stake from nuclear to conventional weapons but also ignores the objective need for negotiations on limitation or reduction of precision weapons. What is more, the entire history of negotiations between the USSR and the U.S. and Russia and the U.S. shows that the United States has always been avoiding limitations of the arms race quality and counted on preservation of their military and technological superiority. These arguments of Russian experts are known (although they are rarely uttered on the political level), "A quality leap in the development of non-nuclear precision weapons begins to cause concern over the survivability of reducing strategic nuclear forces. Open publications are mulling over scenarios of a preventive disarming strike on Russian strategic nuclear forces with non-nuclear seaborne ballistic missiles. As non-nuclear precision weapons start to acquire counter-force capacities, it would be reasonable to suggest the need for bearing in mind this factor in further reductions of strategic offensive armaments[5]".
Negotiations on the limitations and reduction of armaments capable of strategic functions are absolutely necessary but they are not the determinative. First of all, life shows that limitation of conventional armaments and hardware outside of a concrete region (such as Central Europe) is hard to achieve. True, if the numbers of intercontinental ballistic weapons, tactical warheads or fleet ballistic missile submarines counted in hundreds at best, then it is unrealistic to count tens of thousands of conventional weapons or especially to impose any quantity restrictions on tanks, frontline aircraft or helicopters which may carry efficient precision weapons. This is particularly hard to do when the process of limitation disagrees with another two trends - an increase in the quality of armaments and military hardware and their worldwide spread. It is impossible to do both things simultaneously, especially when there is no such wish and the goal is not included in the long-term strategy.
Evidently, one will have to put up with the medium-term trend of the growing counter-force potential or, to be more exact, the preventive first strike potential of non-nuclear weapons. However, it is necessary to map up the prospective agenda: upon a new stage of the arms race negotiations on limiting the weapons will have to begin. Especially as there is some positive experience. Some types of non-nuclear armaments were a subject of Russia-U.S. agreements on the reduction of strategic offensive armaments in the past and limitations and transparency measures applied to them, experts say. They also cite an example, "There is a current trend of removing such weapons from the sphere of limitations. The most illustrative example is the B-1B heavy bomber. This weapon is no longer a subject of the START Treaty. There are also no more limitations on stationing B-1B outside of the national territory and the U.S. no longer has to report the bombers` movements[6]".
Many other examples may be presented to support this trend, from the creation of hypersonic aircraft and strategic cruise missiles to attack drones. That is being done not only in the United States but also in Russia. Let us dwell on one case, which may be little known. Experts said that in 2013 the Russian Defense Ministry would start equipping multi-role submarines of Projects 971 Shchuka-B and 877 Varshavyanka with Kalibr cruise missiles capable of hitting surface targets from the distance of 300 to 2,500 kilometers. The launches can be done from regular 533-millilmeter torpedo tubes every modern submarine has. Kalibr is practically non-destroyable by even the newest air defense systems, including domestic S-300 and S-400. A salvo from a suddenly emerged submarine may destroy several key sites of the enemy at once. That makes multi-role submarines, whose current mission is naval warfare, a universal weapon, the Russian Navy command believes[7].
In this sense, U.S. missile defense has rather limited capabilities that may hardly be enlarged within a short period even with the new types of interceptor missiles. But this does not bother the U.S. much because it intends to destroy Russian submarines in the first strike. There is no other explanation.
Other abilities of the new submarine do not bother the United States either, such the Kalibr precision of hitting a land target of only one-two meters. The 400-kilogram warhead of the missile can destroy any protected site or, in the anti-ship modification, sink any ship of the cruiser size[8]. For one simple reason, the U.S. does not expect them to be used at all. Probably, destruction of any Russian forces that may be used against the U.S. Navy is pinned as primary objectives of the first strike. The intentions are not limited to seaborne or land-based components of the Russian Armed Forces. As to the Air Force, it is manifested with the deployment [with certain difficulty] of the new frontline bomber Sukhoi Su-34, which can use high-precision weapons under any conditions, without entering the zone of operation of a significant part of air defense systems of the enemy, up to 50 kilometers[9].
The list of armaments of the United States and Russia that may be regarded as non-nuclear strategic weapons is not limited to that. There have been fair arguments that the list should also include support systems, such as space-deployed reconnaissance and target indication means, attack drones and cyber-weapons. True, information and control systems play the decisive role now. Their importance was noted back in the period of the elaboration of measures towards limitation of radar stations and military operations in the outer space. In the future, the role of control, especially control over the Aerospace Defense Forces, should inevitably become a subject of political negotiations and agreements. The establishment of a united or, especially, blended aerospace defense system has become a problem the CIS has been unable to resolve for the past 20 years. The latest decisions inspire hope that the impetus given in December 2012 will work.
Still, it is obvious from the point of view of negotiations with the United States that "if Russia wishes to make progress in further reduction of nuclear armaments, it will have to shorten the list and define its proprieties. As of now, there is an impression that the only priorities are intercontinental ballistic missiles and fleet ballistic missile submarines in the non-nuclear modification and weaponry the U.S. is developing in the program of the Prompt Global Strike[10]", the experts said. Certainly, this cannot be a long-term prospect. One needs to think about unavoidable broadening of the subject of negotiations. Before the negotiations start, one should understand the importance of current processes in armaments and military hardware and the art of war. And one of the most promising areas is the development of Eurasian integration in aerospace defense, which may become the sole option in reality.
Military-political integration processes, among them the creation of Eurasian aerospace defense as the main element of the provision of regional security, depend on the readiness of member states for close military-political and military-technical cooperation. Obviously, the degrees of such preparedness may vary. So far it is determined to a large extent by integration processes in other spheres, which is totally wrong. The president of Kazakhstan suggested the idea of "mixed-speed integration" at an informal summit in July 2006, which implied a core of CIS countries prepared to transfer from negotiations on integration terms to integration itself. He offered a CIS reform plan of five points: the migration policy, transport, education, suppression of modern challenges and humanitarian issues. CIS leaders proposed a broader plan to incorporate the formation of a unified stand in international affairs and a common space in the defense policy.
A working group of secretariats of the CSTO Integration Committee and the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) approved in February 2007 a draft list of main cooperation areas of the international organizations, including the military sphere. Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus signed the Customs Union agreement, and the Common Economic Space started to function in January 2012. A decision was made in December 2012 to set up the unified aerospace defense command, but it has remained a statement of intent so far, although a very important one. Urgent and even drastic measures towards military-political and military integration are necessary. They will depend to a large degree on the ability of the Russian defense sector to supply its allies with advanced armaments and military hardware. The "foreign borrowings" policy has no prospect. It logically leads to failure. An example is the degradation of Glonass, which CIS allies are rejecting politely. The reason is the unreliability of Taiwan microchips and dubious personnel solutions[11].
Theoretically, the "crisis response" strategy the CSTO had developed by late 2010 envisaged collective efforts in the protection of security, stability, territorial integrity and sovereignty of member states and joint efforts to suppress threats and challenges and clean up the aftermath of emergency situations. The Collective Operative Reaction Force (CORF) established under a decision of February 2009 is bound to implement this strategy. But that is just a theory. There has been nothing but statements as yet, and the CORF remains a low efficient and never used military instrument.
Presumably, revival of the common defense space of the CSTO with the leading role of Russia should be done in three dimensions - defense, military-political and military-technical - at the same time. It is also necessary to remember that the main advantage of Russia over the United States and its Eurasian allies is that only Russia has a real capacity for mounting forces in the western and southern sectors of the region and in Central Asia within a brief period of time. This is well understood in China, amongst others. It has been lately viewing Russia as the main stabilizing force in Eurasia capable of deterring the U.S. policy of "controlled chaos".
The "controlled chaos" strategy in Eurasia is the true policy of the United States, that rejects any form of Eurasian integration - a postulate clearly expressed by Hillary Clinton in late 2012. The strategy of destabilization of political regimes requires military support. Afghanistan and Iraq showed that it does not require a final victory or formation of capable states. It has another goal - to threaten political leaders of these countries with newest precision weapons to make them act accordingly and to use precision weapons in case of a failure. So whenever they speak about "a failure" of the U.S. policy in Afghanistan and Iraq implying stabilization, it has never been the primary objective of the United States that actually targeted destabilization and chaos. The U.S. gets the desired result by investing in destabilization instead of infrastructural projects. Certainly, little is said about that in public. Official documents conceal and camouflage such goals.
The military dimension of the revival of the common defense space of the CSTO falls into three relatively autonomous regional vectors due to objective reasons: East European (Russia-Belarus), Caucasian (Russia-Armenia) and Central Asian (Russia - Central Asia and Kazakhstan). The common defense space can be restored in several steps[12]. The procedure basically coincides with the U.S. actions. The new U.S. concept formally abandons the traditional opinion that the U.S. army must be prepared for waging two big wars at the same time. There is a new goal of engagement in one large conflict with simultaneous deterrence on another strategic vector at the utmost.
Also the new U.S. strategy includes cooperation with allied and coalition forces as long as possible. A key task is to significantly reduce the land forces and rely more on the Air Force and the Navy for deterring China or such enemies as Iran or North Korea. Reduction of the Army will reduce the intensity of military presence in Europe. At the same time, the U.S. will shift the military force to the Asia Pacific region and its "presence on the Middle East will remain equally significant"[13]. The military priority of the country is well illustrated with the distribution of the U.S. federal budget by main sectors in which the U.S. Defense Department holds over 57% of total expenditures[14].
Comparison of the U.S. Defense Department budget with budgets of other federal agencies
Non-nuclear strategic armaments have a huge role in the Eurasian destabilization strategy. Two new essential issues should be noted in the context of development of aerospace offensive and defensive means:
- firstly, the aerospace has actually turned into one theater of operations at the altitudes from several dozens of meters to hundreds of kilometers. It is extremely difficult, if possible, to divide missile defense and air defense by altitude of detection and tracking of targets and destruction capacities. This inevitably leads to the appearance of new types and systems of armaments, spread of military rivalry into new areas and development of new war techniques. For instance, the United States gave much attention to attack drones, while Russia neglected such programs in the 1990s. Now Russia has created a center for unmanned programs to spell out prospects for the next three years[15]. Applicably to Eurasian states, this means that the former "troop" approach to the development of armaments and military hardware has lost its efficiency. Defense requires means they cannot have in principle, from space systems to aerospace defense of the short, medium and long range. What is more, they need to be integrated into territories of not just one but several countries. That can be achieved only with close military-political and military-technical cooperation of several Eurasian states. It is senseless to buy Russian short-range air defense systems, even the most advanced once, without integrating them into early warning systems and linking them to medium-range air defense;
- secondly, cheaper and better precision weapons and aircraft have created a totally new situation in which cruise missiles, hypersonic aircraft, attack drones and other non-nuclear weapons actually became a part of the strategic offensive potential and there has been no efficient aerospace defense means to counteract them so far. Deterrence of such an attack with a strike of strategic nuclear forces becomes unavoidable, which is recognized but still requires formalization in the Russian military doctrine, the national security concept and the foreign policy concept. The same is true for other Eurasian states, including those that have nuclear deterrence forces. It is unclear what China may do, bearing in mind the opinions of several experts who say that non-nuclear high-precision weapons may destroy 100% of strategic targets in China. The situation becomes practically hopeless for other states. Libya showed that several days were enough to disorganize resistance and destroy the defense potential.
Prospects for the development of destruction and information means are such that one should expect the soonest major change of the entire balance of strategic (nuclear) forces and means and the role of the national strategic rocket forces. Nevertheless, Russia is confident that only modernization of strategic nuclear forces can preserve the nuclear missile parity. In my opinion, creation of new and modernization of existent intercontinental ballistic missiles, fleet ballistic missile submarines and tactical warheads alone can hardly guarantee efficient protection from hundreds of thousands high-precision weapons used from practically every strategic vector. Especially as their flight time is constantly reducing, the precision is growing and coordination between these means is improving. One may imagine an air attack of dozens (hundreds) of thousands of attack drones, hypersonic and cruise missiles destroying practically all the strategic targets in our territory. Meanwhile, U.S. global missile defense can destroy retaliation forces.
It is also necessary to monitor very carefully the R&D evolution, creation and development of non-nuclear precision weapons, concepts of their use and proliferation to other regions on the planet. That makes substantial adjustments to the plans of deployment of Russian aerospace defense systems and concepts of their use. But this is not just that. It seems the post-Soviet states have been carried away with multi-vector policies and balancing between various centers of force without realizing that they will have to choose their priorities at some point. This applies to military issues, primarily newest conventional armaments. This is a political choice all the Eurasian countries will have to make. Consensus about the policy on the U.S., China and the European Union is another task, as experts justly indicate[16].
There is an objective question of negotiations on limitations of non-nuclear strategic weapons both in Europe and Eurasia in spite of the complexity of this mission. One should remind that while the CFE Treaty[17] has just been signed, it stresses the importance of stability and liquidation of the risk of a sudden attack[18]. In the second decade of the 21st century the danger of a sudden and massive attack of precision weapons becomes a political reality that must stop being ignored. Anyway, the problem has to be formulated and added to the agenda.
The potential threat of direct use of military force with newest precision weapons is growing in rapidly developing states. This is obvious from arms procurement data. For the past ten years only China has turned from a major importer of armaments and military hardware into a manufacturer and exporter, according to SIPRI surveys. Imports of armaments and military hardware of India, South Korea, Pakistan, Turkey and a number of other countries[19] are rocketing. On the whole, military expenditures of these states doubled in the past decade and new technologies became accessible to all.
Importers of main types of conventional armaments in 2005-2009
Ranking 2005-2009; Ranking 2004-2008; importer; import amounts (trend indicator); percentage 2005-2009
China, India, South Korea, the UAE, Greece, Israel, Singapore, the U.S., Algeria, Pakistan, Turkey, Malaysia
Global proliferation of high-precision weapons is swift, which makes potential conflicts more realistic and rapid. Not only the progress of hostilities but also, in the long run, sovereignty of states depend on high-precision weapons and air defense/missile defense systems. The situation has profound political consequences:
- firstly, states fall into serious dependence on suppliers of newest precision weapons and aerospace defense systems that may dictate their will already in the peace time. These systems have become a major item on the negotiating table;
- secondly, deliveries of such systems become a way of political pressure or a condition of the development of bilateral relations. For instance, the deployment of Patriot air defense systems in Turkey signified political support to the Syrian opposition;
- thirdly, availability or lack of precision weapons and aerospace defense systems has the decisive influence on the correlation of forces in any part of the globe predetermining the capacity of a state to retain its sovereignty.
The aforesaid is directly related to the question of Eurasian integration and Eurasian aerospace defense; integration in this area becomes a guarantee of sovereignty and independence of a country and frees it from the external hostile influence. This circumstance makes the Eurasian aerospace defense issue a major political problem of Eurasian integration.
According to this table, arms exporters (excluding Russia) - the United States, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Italy and Spain - control over 60% of the world exports of armaments and military hardware and actually impose their rules of the game and security conditions[20]. Obviously, the United States and its allies - Germany, France and the United Kingdom - dominate the market of precision weapons. Russia, a leading exporter, has a small share on the precision weaponry market.
Exporters of main types of conventional armaments in 2005-2009
Ranking 2005-2009; Ranking 2004-2008; exporter; export amounts (trend indicator); percentage 2005-2009.
The United States, Russia, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Italy
Speaking of Eurasian integration, one should bear in mind that the most important and promising sphere - cooperation in joint development and production of non-nuclear (primarily) strategic armaments and aerospace defense systems has stayed in the shadows so far. To be more exact, it is obviously underestimated, both from the political and military-technical points of view. Joint activity of the sort will inevitably have the following consequences for Eurasian states:
- stronger sovereignty;
- development of fundamental science and R&D, including civilian sectors;
- liberation from technological dependence;
- creation of a common scientific, education and industrial basis.
Eurasian Aerospace Defense: Role of Strategic Non-Nuclear Arms.
By A.I. Podberezkin[2]
Summary: This article analyzes the problem of acquisition by the non-nuclear precision-guided weapon (PGW) of functions of offensive and defensive means. According to the author all strategic objectives in the territory of Russia that can be destroyed by so-called "disarming" first blow of the opponent will have been targeted by PGW by 2020. The author motes, a new stage of military and technical revolution, having created new types of the high-precision weapon caused not only serious changes in arrangement of military-political forces in the world, but also sweeping changes in military art, having changed the relation to military force as to the foreign policy tool. It is again "used" in small and large conflicts and wars. The author finds possible creation of the Eurasian aerospace defense (AD) only at military integration within the Eurasian union. In the second decade of the XXI century danger of sudden and massive attack by means of strategic non-nuclear arms becomes political reality.
Keywords
Aerospace defense, non-nuclear strategic weapon, precision weapons, military integration, the disarming first strike, a heavy bomber, a hypersonic aircraft, strategic cruise missiles
[1] Alexey Ivanovich Podberezkin - - Dr. of Science (History), Professor, MGIMO (U) of the MFA of Russia, Pro-Rector for Science.
Notes
[1] Antonov A.I. Arms Control: History, Current Condition and Prospects, M, ROSPEN, PIR-Center, 2012
[2] Jean-Bernard Pinatel, Russia-Europe: A Vital Union/translation from French by D.H. Khalillullina, M, Book Club 36.6, 2012, p. 102
[3] News from Abroad/VKO, 2012 No 5 (66) p. 86
[4] Myasnikov Y. V. Satan and Minuteman Replacements Take Combat Positions// Nezavisimaya Gazeta, September 28, 2012 / http://nvo.ng.ru/armament/2012-09-28/11_satan.html
[5] Idem
[6] Idem
[7] Mikhailov A. Russian Subs to Go Ashore with Kalibr //Izvestia November 16, 2012 p. 3.
[8] Same
[9] Mikhailov A. Defense Ministry Displeased with Su-34 Bomber Makers// Izvestia, November 16, 2012, p. 3.
[10] Myasnikov Y.V. Satan and Minuteman Replacements Take Combat Positions// Nezavisimaya Gazeta, September 28, 2012 / http://nvo.ng.ru/armament/2012-09-28/11_satan.html
[11] Myasnikov Y.V. Defense Ministry`s Hopes for GLONASS Fail // Nezavisimaya Gazeta, December 21, 2012, pp. 1, 4.
[12] Zakharov V. Eurasian Project // National Defense. August No 8. 2012
[13] Chaikovsky M.M.. Kazantsev A.A. Comparison of Defense Potentials of the U.S., China and some Asia Pacific Countries. Analytical Report, M. MGIMO University, 2012. May, p. 5.
[14] Statement of Asif A. Khan, Director Financial Management and Assurance. Challenges in Attaining Audit Readiness and Improving Business Processes and Systems. GAO-12-642T, April 18, 2012. DOD Financial Management / http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/590203.pdf.
[15] Russian General Staff Center for Unmanned Programs to make three-year plans / December 26, 2012 / http://eurasian-defence.ru
[16] Yastremsky A.M., Post-Soviet Space Integration: Problems and Prospects// World and Policy. 2012. No 10 (73). p. 103.
[17] The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty was signed in Paris on November 19, 1990, by six member countries of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and 16 NATO member states. It entered into force on November 9, 1992.
[18] Antonov A.I. Control of Conventional Armaments in Europe - End of Regime or a Story to Be Continued? / PIR-Center Scientific Notes 2012. No 1(27). p. 9.
[19] SIPRI Yearbook 2010. Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. М.., Russian Academy of Sciences Institute of World Economy and International Relations 2011. p. 345.
[20] SIPRI Yearbook 2010. Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. М.., Russian Academy of Sciences Institute of World Economy and International Relations 2011. p. 349.
