Oleg Aleksandrov
This article is devoted to a problem of security of the Arctic region. The author portrays the contemporary state of the Arctic region, indicates changes which happened in the region after the end of the Cold War, analyzes the role which regional and non-regional institutions can play in the security protection of the Arctic, and also focuses attention on the Russian approach to a problem of security of the Arctic[1].
Over the past decades the Arctic region has been undergoing crucial changes primarily caused by warming. The steady melting of Arctic ice is remapping the entire range of regional relationships - military-strategic, political, economic and humanitarian. The hottest topic is Arctic energy resources, which amount to 25% of the world`s total, in the opinion of many experts and according to geological surveys of a number of states. First and foremost, this is the question of their division between Arctic states and aspects associated with this process.
The epoch of cheap crude is about to end and the number of parties seeking to participate in the division of Arctic resources is growing. They are not being put off with the high costs of hydrocarbon production on the Arctic shelf. The main intrigue is whether this division can be peaceful or we will bear witness to armed conflicts. Debates on security image of the Arctic region are gaining momentum against this backdrop.
The Arctic Yesterday and Today
In the Cold War years the Arctic was a territory of confrontation between the West and the East and a place of concentration of substantial military forces. The Arctic Ocean was the shortest route for intercontinental ballistic missiles and strategic bombers. Submarines of the U.S. and the USSR energetically made themselves familiar with northern latitudes and the NATO bloc created and developed its ample military infrastructure - airfields, monitoring stations and submarine bases in Norway, Greenland (Denmark), Iceland, the United States and Canada. The Soviet Union tested nuclear weapons and built up its military muscle in the Arctic. The North Fleet was known to be the most combat-capable of all Soviet fleets. In other words, the West and the East regarded the Arctic as the most probable ground for a clash between the leading powers of those times - the United States and the Soviet Union. There the protagonists expected an attack and prepared to deter it.
Military confrontation in the Arctic is gone now. Its only remnant is the military infrastructure of regional countries and regular military exercises of NATO. Nevertheless, many experts and journalists continue to describe the Arctic division in Cold War terms. The subject of Arctic confrontation has smoothly shifted from the military-political sphere to the information field. The day, when "the great battle for the Arctic" scenario will be in demand in Hollywood, is not far away. Meanwhile, the official standpoint of the majority of regional countries is that confrontational stability in the Arctic has been supplanted with cooperation and dialog.
In short, security climate in the Arctic has also warmed to a considerable degree although public opinion is yet to catch up with the regional transformations. In the meantime, profoundness and swiftness of transformations create an atmosphere of uncertainly and generate various kinds of phobias. Security climate in the Arctic is being influenced by potential threats, conflicts of states interest and transnational companies, environmental risks and unsettled territorial disputes, covert confrontations, emerging alliances and counter-alliances and everything else that forms the regional milieu.
Political architecture of the Arctic
International contacts in the region are so intensive that they have long gone beyond bilateral relations. The majority of regional problems have a transboundary nature to a large extent. Hence, the Arctic Council, which was intended to be a forum for consideration of regional problems of the natural resources development and initially avoided security issues and other "high politics", is steadily gaining political weight. Many countries and even the world`s largest integration groups (such as the EU) that have put the Arctic on the list of their foreign political interests are seeking to have an observer status. As of now, the Arctic Council still incorporates all the eight regional countries, a number of non-governmental organizations and representatives of indigenous peoples of the North.
The Arctic Five Forum, which marks its 5th anniversary this year, adds to the regional political architecture. There are also some sub-regional unions, among them the Nordic Council of Ministers and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, and a few non-governmental entities. In general, the institutional structure of the region has transformed a lot to become a complex multi-level structure that rests upon intensive bilateral and multilateral contacts between Arctic states and aforesaid institutions.
Although regional transformations continue, the institutional structure of the Arctic has already been formed and we can hardly see the appearance of something completely new. The overwhelming majority of regional states support further strengthening of the Arctic Council`s role and broadening of its operations. Notably, even the United States, which had been reserved about strengthening the regional institutions, said in 2010 that the Arctic Council format was more preferable than the Arctic Five in a number of matters. The Agreement on Aeronautical and Maritime Search Cooperation signed in 2011 was an obvious step forward in the Arctic Council activity. Thus, the Arctic Council displayed its ability to broaden the traditional "climate and environmental protection" agenda with "soft security" issues.
Another Arctic forum, the Arctic Five, is tackling different matters. Its primary objective is to determine the continental shelf borders of the coastal states and promote environmental awareness in the Arctic region. In addition, the Arctic Five Forum plays the role of an extra floor for negotiations between representatives of countries which have direct access to the Arctic Ocean and aspire for the division of its shelf. It seems the Arctic Five may make a decision on the allotment of Arctic Ocean areas for "a world heritage zone". Altercations between states over the distribution of Arctic resources threaten stability of the Arctic region and create a risk of a serious conflict of interest, which under certain circumstances may develop into an armed confrontation.
The official Russian opinion on the Arctic region security is that there are no military threats in the region or they are minimal. The opinion is expressed in the Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic in the Period until 2020 and Further Prospect[1]. The Russian strategy is explicit about the wish to preserve the Arctic as a zone of peace and cooperation. Yet the military security aspect of the strategy targets "a favorable operative regime in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation, including provision of the necessary combat potential of general-purpose groups of the Russian Armed Forces, other forces and military units and bodies in that region." The Russian vision is consistent with the position of other regional countries to a large degree. For instance, the Arctic strategy of Sweden also proceeds from the premise that "security challenges in the Arctic region have no military nature[2]". Paradoxically enough the more frequently states speak about peace, disarmament and cooperation, the more active they are arming themselves.
Competition for Right to Provide Arctic Security
A discussion of methods of the regional security provision and maintenance one way or another develops into a discussion of specific institutes that could build up regional confidence and prevent crises. Therefore, it would be helpful to give a brief profile of the potential of NATO, the OSCE and the UN as organizations Arctic countries could count on in the provision of regional security. An alternative scenario is the reliance of Arctic states exclusively on regional institutions, for instance, on the existent Arctic Council or another organization the region may produce to solve missions of the kind.
Is the North Atlantic Alliance capable of making a significant contribution to the strengthening of security in the Arctic region? The answer seems to be "no" rather than "yes" and there are a number of reasons for that:
- firstly, the regional political architecture is already formed and every institution operating in the region has occupied its niche. The only sphere in which NATO may hypothetically manifest itself is hard security. But, in the opinion of Arctic countries and the majority of experts, the region faces no threats linked with the appearance and escalation of armed conflicts. In this case the invitation of NATO to the region would be equal to the acknowledgment that the Arctic region has a deficit of security, and that is wrong. It must be noted though that NATO is already present in the region de facto because four out of the Arctic Five states are its members. Seven out of eight Arctic Council members are either NATO countries or actively cooperate with the alliance on the permanent basis. In this context "the invitation" of NATO would mean the alliance`s role of an arbiter in the discussion of internal regional problems;
- secondly, only an organization uniting all regional states without an exception can efficiently resolve regional security problems. In this case, Russia - a leading Arctic state - is not a NATO member. This is a rather weighty argument that allows Russia to block the alliance`s attempts to play a more active role in the Arctic. What is more, Russian relations with NATO in the past few decades have been characterized by mutual mistrust and extremely contradictory dynamics;
- thirdly, another deterrent is the tentative and balanced position of the majority of regional states. They realize that the attraction of NATO to the region would de facto mean the enhancement of the role of the United States and other influential countries of the alliance in the Arctic. That would not only disagree with their national interests in the region but may also ruin the climate of trust that formed in the Arctic after the end of the Cold War. Not only Russia and Sweden but also the majority of regional countries with the exception of Norway sees no need in projecting the NATO military potential onto the Arctic. Besides, the position of Oslo was made public before the conclusion of a large-scale agreement with Russia in 2010. So, against the backdrop of a successfully developing Arctic dialogue there is no need for "securitization" of the problem of sides` differing positions in these or those aspects of the Arctic development. Such differences are quite natural and can be settled successfully in the bilateral dialog or on the existent negotiating floors, the Arctic Council and the Arctic Five.
It is much easier to evaluate the UN role of an arbiter in the discussion of Arctic problems because unlike NATO, the UN is already playing it. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 is the fundamental legal document concerning the division of the Arctic continental shelf, and the relevant UN committee is entitled to consider applications from Arctic states on the broadening of these borders. The UN regulatory role in the provision of security of the Arctic region has paramount importance, especially as the UN basic principles are pillars of international and national laws.
Still, the UN will be able to offer practical measures in the provision of Arctic security. The reason is simple: the organization is already heavily involved in the settlement of crises worldwide. The UN has no mechanisms of military compulsion in the execution of peacekeeping duties. Pursuant to Chapter VIII of its Charter, the UN may only interact with regional organizations and structures in peace enforcement operations. On the other hand, far from all Arctic states de facto recognize the UN supremacy in the solution of global and regional security problems. For instance, the U.S. has not ratified the aforesaid United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982. Nevertheless, authority of the United Nations is much higher than authority of NATO, which gives hope that the regulatory role of the United Nations in the settlement of Arctic problems will be preserved and countries will be wise enough not to destroy the existent cooperation framework.
The OSCE seems to be the weakest candidate for a guarantor of security in the Arctic region. The only merit of the once rather authoritative European forum is the idea of forming a common security space from Vancouver to Vladivostok that has been suggested at the organization many times and declared in final documents of its summits. Its definition of the common security space includes the entire Arctic region. Although the idea was put forward, the OSCE did almost nothing to implement it. Russian and foreign observers took notice of the continuous degradation of the European forum back in the late 1990. There are a growing number of questions about the place and role of the OSCE in the new European security architecture and doubts about its viability, capacity to respond to new security challenges and to retain authority in the eyes of member countries.
Moscow has been traditionally regarding the CSCE/OSCE as an authoritative organization that may still contribute to the strengthening of Russia`s position on the international arena, permit the use of its status as a state-successor of the USSR in the solution of key problems of Europe and the post-Soviet space and prevent formation of the NATO-centered model of European security. But since the late 1990s the OSCE has been losing ground in the settlement of regional security problems, including preventive diplomacy and post-conflict settlement.
By playing a secondary role in the European security architecture, the OSCE leaves itself no chance to reinforce its positions in the Arctic region. The OSCE loses every significant position to the UN and NATO. It has neither authority comparable with UN authority, nor a mechanism of military provision of security. The OSCE loses this sphere to NATO. What is more, by denying support to the Russian idea of a European security treaty, the OSCE has actually confirmed the impossibility of its return to the lost ground.
The majority of Arctic states is realistic about the situation and advocates for preservation of the status quo. Yet everyone puts one`s own accent. For instance, Norway favors involvement of NATO in the settlement of regional security problems. Sweden puts the emphasis on a bigger role of regional institutions (the Arctic Council, the Nordic Council of Ministers and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council), as well as on full-fledged participation of the European Union in Arctic affairs. The position of Finland is similar with the Swedish position by many parameters. Denmark wants a higher role of the Arctic Council and a higher role of the European Union in the Arctic. Iceland wants demilitarization of the Arctic region and strengthening of the Arctic Council. Canada and the United States have not officially campaigned for strengthening the position of NATO in the region, thus leaving space for independent maneuvering. Yet both of them believe that the Arctic Council is a useful and efficient organization.
What is Russia`s interest?
Under these circumstances Russia also thinks that the status quo should be preserved rather than changes should be made. Military-strategic equilibrium in the Arctic, which builds up confidence and fosters the provision of regional security predominantly by regional states and organizations, meets the interests of Russia. In this context Russia is interested in strengthening the role of the Arctic Council as the main regional institute capable of solving "soft security" problems. Without urging demilitarization of the region, which could be a wild dream considering the present-day realities, Russia is promoting the principle of reasonable sufficiency in the provision of national security by each state of the Arctic region. It should be noted that of all the Arctic states Russia has been the only one to substantially cut its military potential in the Arctic, first of all, the number of ships and servicemen of the North Fleet. Moscow can exercise an even more profound influence on the security climate in the Arctic. For instance, the aforesaid European security treaty draft could be applied to the Arctic, ease tensions in the relations between certain Arctic states and introduce the principle of "indivisible security" in the region.
Due to the intensified military activity of a number of states in the Arctic, there is a need not only to sign a security agreement of the sort in the Arctic but also to reconsider the very concept of regional security. For a number of reasons the Arctic cannot become a nuclear-free zone or a territory free from all types of armaments. But Arctic states may arrive at a common understanding of what is necessary for laying down a solid foundation for regional security. For example, Arctic states are quite able to agree on limiting military presence in the high seas, restricting military exercises near borders of third countries and limiting or banning military activity of non-Arctic states in the Arctic Ocean. Finally, the development of Arctic transport routes and the projected increase in sea shipping of energy resources adds to the agenda the issues of environmental security, which would include personal responsibility for oil spills. Both states and large oil and transport companies may become signatories to such agreements.
Arctic security is unthinkable without confidence building measures in the region. Although the Arctic is transforming from a zone of confrontation into a zone of cooperation, the historical memory of the Cold War and confrontation period has not gone. The temptation to use old methods for tackling new challenges is a possible threat to security. By sharing with Arctic neighbors the memories of those events, Russia may be the most sensitive to changing balance of forces in the region.
The Russian Arctic policy of the past four to five years aimed mostly to defend and promote its economic interests in the region and to ensure national security. At the same time, Russia understands similar activity of the other regional states. But this is just one side of the medal. On the other side, Moscow has fears that measures taken towards the provision of security of certain states may trigger an arms race in the Arctic. As I have said before, while not fostering regional demilitarization as an unrealistic scenario, Russia is concerned over the escalating military activity of regional states especially if such activities go beyond national borders and include a growing number of military exercises or intensified operations of military alliances.
Therefore, the term "reasonable sufficiency" is a rather precise definition of the Moscow standpoint on the Arctic security. In the practical sense that may be the recognition of rights of Arctic countries to keep their territories and interests secure with the means and forces they consider possible without exceeding the limits of their national frontiers. In recent years Russia has supported all types of interaction between Arctic states in the "soft security" area, including search and rescue operations, climate change monitoring, security of cross-polar air routes and sea shipping, suppression of illegal migration, interaction between border services and so on and so forth. For instance, Russia has taken a number of steps towards tightening control over the use of the Northern Sea Route. A new edition of the Law on the Northern Sea Route was adopted in June 2012 to define the route as a "historical national transport route of the Russian Federation[3]". The move of Russia aims to have a soft non-discriminative control over the use of the route and high security standards for Russian and foreign vessels.
Climate change in the Arctic and ice melting on a vast territory give Russia a unique chance to overcome its status of a continental Eurasian country and become a full-value sea power. Ice melting along the Russian Arctic coast, within the exclusive economic zone, contributes to that. The ice-free waters of the Arctic Ocean give Russia unhampered access to the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Naturally, the new climate conditions in the Arctic put new accents on Russian security tasks. The Russian Arctic policy is bound to choose these emphases in the near future.
The world`s first floating nuclear power plant, the Academician Lomonosov, is due to be commissioned by 2016. It will help Russia provide steady power supply to cities of the Russian North and, applicably to the security sphere, to create favorable conditions for the all-year-round operation of Arctic military bases. Consistent with the Marine Activity Development Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2030 five nuclear power units of the kind are to be built in future. The Rosatom State Corporation and Baltiysky Zavod-Sudostroyeniye, LLC signed an agreement in August 2012 to build nuclear icebreakers of a new class. Availability of a powerful icebreaking fleet will not just give Russia competitive advantages; it will also enhance its security in the Arctic. No matter what, it is possible to ensure Russian security in the Arctic in the long run only on one condition: a systemic policy regarding this region, which includes political, energy, military, humanitarian and socioeconomic aspects.
Summing up the article, it is necessary to mention the following: from the security point of view the Arctic is a region that has experienced significant changes within a brief period, predominantly related to climate warming and ice melting on a significant part of the Arctic Ocean. In turn, climate change raises the question of updating borders in the Arctic and dividing and developing oil and gas fields on the Arctic shelf; it leaves an imprint on the geo-political distribution of regional forces, creates an atmosphere of uncertainty and brings back to life phobias of the Cold War period. All these factors may jeopardize regional security to one degree or another, provoke a growth of mutual mistrust and lead to a clash of interests of different countries.
At the same time, the Arctic, like many other regions of the world, is an area with a rather well developed international legal and institutional foundation and intensive inter-state contacts, i.e. everything necessary for peaceful settlement of altercations. For that reason, security of the Arctic may be ensured by Arctic states themselves, without active use of external assistance. The signing of the Arctic Council Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search is an example of collective participation of Arctic states in the settlement of urgent security matters. It seems that attempts of a number of Arctic countries or concrete politicians to play the "Russian card" in the Arctic game for attracting NATO to the region for the prospective pressure on Moscow would be counter-productive. They would have broken the hitherto fragile foundation of trust in relations between regional countries and forced Moscow to seek allies amongst non-Arctic countries.
Finally, an important factor of regional security in the foreseeable future will be the influence of non-Arctic states in the Arctic, their mounting economic and, potentially, military presence in the region. More than 30 states, not to mention the largest integration union - the EU, have declared their serious interest in the Arctic and its resources. In this situation security in the Arctic will depend on efforts of Arctic states, their ability to reinforce regional institutes and to reach agreement on key aspects of security of the Arctic region.
Aleksandrov O. Who Will Provide Security for the Arctic?
Summary: This article is devoted to a problem of security of the Arctic region. The author portrays the contemporary state of the Arctic region, indicates changes which happened in the region after the end of "the cold war", analyzes the role which regional and non-regional institutions can play in the security protection of the Arctic, and also focuses attention on the Russian approach to a problem of security of the Arctic.
Keywords
Military-strategic balance, security climate, search and rescue operations, soft security.
Aleksandrov Oleg Borisovich - Ph. D., Associate Professor of the Russian Foreign Ministry MGIMO University Department of International Relations and Foreign Policy of Russia. E-mail: aleksandrov-oleg@yandex.ru.
Notes
[1] Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic in the Period until 2020 and Further Prospect URL: http://www.rg.ru/2009/03/30/arktika-osnovy-dok.html.
[2] Sweden`s Strategy for the Arctic region. Government Offices of Sweden. Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Stockholm, 2011.
[3] The Federal Law On Adjustment of Separate Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation with Regard to State Regulation of Commercial Shipping along the Northern Sea Route// Rossiyskaya Gazeta 30.07.2012. No172.
10 июня 2013 г.
